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The notion of establishing a parent-child relationship based upon the
intent of the parties who are involved in the production of the child is
alien to Jewish thought.1

INTRODUCTION
The traditional Jewish family structure, like all other theological family
* This article is adapted from YEHEZKEL MARGALIT, THE JEWISH FAMILY: BETWEEN

FAMILY LAW AND CONTRACT LAW (2017).
** Visiting Research Scholar, New York University Law School (2011-2012); Senior
Lecturer of Law, Netanya Academic College and Bar-Ilan University; PhD (Law); M.A.
(Law); L.L.B. Bar-Ilan University. Special thanks are due to Ronnie Warburg and
Pamela Laufer-Ukeles who provided me with helpful comments while I was writing this
Article.
1. See Chaim Povarsky, Regulating Advanced Reproductive Technologies: A
Comparative Analysis of Jewish and American Law, 29 U. TOL. L. REV. 409, 428 (1998)
[hereinafter Regulating ART]. For a similar but milder 64?4';':4 4#?4 GM?R?T#? #?6 :94
granted legal validity to the . . @ 8?7':4?R 7'R?4!9:6 *9:64!424'( =N #2;?: *9;;!4;':4A/
see NOAM J. ZOHAR, ALTERNATIVES IN JEWISH BIOETHICS V+ E+UU"D< 4#!6 984!9: G#?6:.4
been discussed in Jewish legal sources . . . Jewish law does not traditionally recognize
4#' '64?=R!6#;':4 9% 8?7':4?R 64?426 =N !:4':4 !: ?:N %97; @ @ @/< see also Pamela LauferUkeles, Gestation: Work for Hire or the Essence of Motherhood? A Comparative Legal
Analysis, 9 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL.Y 91, 104 (2002) [hereinafter Gestation].
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structures, consists of a horizontal relationship between spouses and a
vertical relationship between parent and child. Elsewhere,2 I discussed
extensively the various dispositive contractual aspects of the spousal
relationship. In this article, I will discuss the dispositive elements of the
parent-child relationship. It is worth noting at the outset the acute normative
gap between these two similar but different relationships; whereas private
ordering is feasible in the spousal relationship, in the parent-child
relationship it is far more complicated. This is generally the case in all legal
systems and particularly in the Jewish (halakhic) legal system.
In a spousal agreement we are dealing with two sovereign adults who have
the legal capacity to negotiate their monetary relationship and all other
dispositive elements of their status as a married couple. In stark contrast, the
parent-child agreement primarily concerns the child, who is obviously the
subject of that arrangement. Should the child be bound by that agreement?
Or is he only a third-party beneficiary to the parental agreement, thus
7';?!:!:$ %7'' 49 *R?!; #!6 7!$#46 P#!R' 494?RRN !$:97!:$ #!6 8?7':46.
agreement? Furthermore, the child is often a minor who cannot consent to
#!6 8?7':46. ?$7'';':4A ?6 #' lacks the legal capacity to do so. In the vast
majority of jurisdictions, a parental agreement should be inspected in light
of the best interests of the child, EG5L3/D which means that any contract that
might damage the BIC should be invalid.3 How can we validate these private
agreements if we do not ensure that they are not detrimental to the BIC and
do not deprive him of any of his rights and interests?
The legality and enforceability of any specific parental contractual
stipulation, such as who should 6288RN 4#' *#!R(.6 %99( ?:( =?6!* :''(6A P#9
should decide where and what he will learn, which medical treatments he
will receive, and so on, is problematic in light of the abovementioned
shortcomings of the parent-child agreement. Clearly, any agreement for
establishing the legal parenthood of individuals who will be considered a
*#!R(.6 R'$?R 8?7':46A %2R%!RR #!6 0?7!926 :''(6A ?:( 7'*'!0' 4#' 0?7!926
parental rights is much more complicated, since its implications are
2. YEHEZKEL MARGALIT, THE JEWISH FAMILY: BETWEEN FAMILY LAW AND
CONTRACT LAW 1-134 (2017) [hereinafter THE JEWISH FAMILY].
3. For the centrality of the BIC in the American legal system as the main factor for
validating any parental agreement, as it regards child custody, see Restatement (Second)
of Contracts § 191 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). For practical implementation and an academic
discussion of § 191 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, see Commonwealth ex rel.
Strunk v. Cummins, 392 A.2d 817 (Pa. Super. 1978); Jeffrey A. Parness, Parentage
Prenups and Midnups, 31 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 343, 345 n.11 (2015).
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dramatically far-reaching for the child, his parents, and society as a whole.4
Nonetheless, such parental agreements, which I define as determining legal
parenthood by agreement, (“DLPBA”) are slowly but surely becoming more
prevalent, nuanced, and detailed in modern times due to today’s greater
social openness and the rapid biomedical developments in the field of
reproduction.
As I have elaborated in some of my previous research, the last few decades
have witnessed dramatic changes in the institutions of family and
parenthood. If, in the past, the family was strongly influenced by the bionormative, “traditional”5 theological family structure, defined as a pair of
heterosexual parents living together under one roof along with their children,
sociological changes have led to a rapid and extreme transformation in the
definitions of family, marital relations, parenthood, and the relationship
between parents and children. Furthermore, “biomedical procedures, such as
artificial insemination, sperm/ova/zygote donation and surrogacy, which
have been described by scholars as a “revolution” and as the “Wild West of
American medicine,” have separated marital relations and fertility.”6
Thus, today, the traditional family structure has lost much of its strength,
and greater emphasis has been placed on individual autonomy, choice, and
the legitimate ability to DLPBA.7 This departure from theological marriage
4. For the importance and consequences of establishing legal parenthood, see
Yehezkel Margalit, To Be or Not to Be (A Parent)? - Not Precisely the Question: The
Frozen Embryo Dispute, 18 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 355, 361-63 (2012) [hereinafter
Frozen Embryo Dispute].
5. For this term, see Katharine K. Baker, Bionormativity and the Construction of
Parenthood, 42 GA. L. REV. 649, 653-54 (2008).
6. See Yehezkel Margalit, Bridging the Gap Between Intent and Status: A New
Framework for Modern Parentage, 15 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 1, 4 (2016);
Povarsky, supra note 1, at 409-11.
7. For the growing acceptance of DLPBA in recent decades, see Frozen Embryo
Dispute, supra note 4, at 358-61. For leading articles maintaining that, in the modern era,
intentional parenthood is the best model for determining legal parenthood, particularly
in the context of reproductive technology, see Mary Patricia Byrn & Erica Holzer,
Codifying the Intent Test, 41 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 130 (2015); John L. Hill, What
Does it Mean to be a “Parent”? The Claims of Biology as the Basis for Parental Rights,
66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 413–20 (1991); Alexa E. King, Solomon Revisited: Assigning
Parenthood in the Context of Collaborative Reproduction, 5 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 329,
367–99 (1995); Heather Kolinsky, The Intended Parent: The Power and Problems
Inherent in Designating and Determining Intent in the Context of Parental Rights, 119
PENN ST. L. REV. 801 (2015); Perri Koll, The Use of the Intent Doctrine to Expand the
Rights of Intended Homosexual Male Parents in Surrogacy Custody Disputes, 18
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and parenthood coupled with the inability of traditional parentage models to
satisfactorily address the realities of modern parenthood requires increased
reliance on private ordering to determine legal parenthood. This process has
already begun to some extent: to bridge the gap between evolving social and
technological norms and prevailing normative laws, individuals have sought
to privately regulate their familial relationships by private agreement and
contracts.8 This trend will likely continue in the future as the diversity and
complexity of the methods for creating a family and/or producing a child
increase.9
Following the brief discussion above of the sociological and biomedical
background for the increasing proliferation of these arrangements and
agreements as well as exploring the troubling civil aspects of DLPBA, I wish
to examine specific problematic halakhic angles of this issue. As can be
deduced from the discussions in my book, the halakhic conceptualization of
spousal relations is a rigid status that derives directly from the nearly
absolute obligation to marry.10 Therefore, any contractual stipulation or even
a complete explicit contract in this regard would be void, as it falls under the
*?4'$97N 9% G9:' P#9 64!82R?4'6 ?=924 P#?4 !6 P7!44': !: 4#' -97?#@/ -#'
same would apply to the parent-child relationship, because of the first
CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 199, 223J)& E)>++D< K'66' H@ F!OA GYou Only Donated
;!GE'2+ 6B>%C 7%?G%? ?# 6!@#8" A5?GE%>?& 1CEGG'G%?B, 11 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 487, 494
(2009); Jason Oller, Can I Get That in Writing?: Established and Emerging Protections
of Paternity Rights [In re K.M.H., 169 P.3d 1025 (Kan. 2007)], 48 WASHBURN L.J. 209,
220J23, 235J37 (2008); Dara E. Purvis, Intended Parents and the Problem of
Perspective, 24 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 210, 227J53 (2012); Marjorie Maguire Shultz,
Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender
Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297, 321J98 (1990); Andrea E. Stumpf, Redefining
Mother: A Legal Matrix for New Reproductive Technologies, 96 YALE L.J. 187, 192J
208 (1986); Katherine M. Swift, Parenting Agreements, The Potential Power of
Contract, And the Limits of Family Law, 34 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 913, 930J57 (2007);
Deborah H. Wald, The Parentage Puzzle: The Interplay Between Genetics, Procreative
Intent, and Parental Conduct in Determining Legal Parentage, 15 AM. U. J. GENDER
SOC. POL.Y & L. 379, 388-89 (2007D; Catherine Villareale, The Case of Two Biological
Intended Mothers: Illustrating the Need to Statutorily Define Maternity in Maryland, 42
U. BALT. L. REV. 365 (2013).
8. See generally Linda D. Elrod, 1 /@>8"0B AGEB!G$?><G #F -GF>%>%C 5 A5EG%?+ 9@G
Case for Intended Parenthood, 25 BYU J. PUB. L. 245 (2011).
9. See Yehezkel Margalit, Artificial Insemination from Donor (AID) * From Status
to Contract and Back Again?, 21 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 69, 70 (2015) [hereinafter Status
to Contract].
10. See THE JEWISH FAMILY, supra note 2, at 17-18.
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commandment, both chronologically and in importance, to be fruitful and
multiply.11
Thus, prima facie, halakhah leaves no room for any private ordering of
the parent-child relationship because of this relationship’s rigid halakhic
status,12 and any private agreement to change any of its implications is
rejected from the outset, particularly when the parent’s identity is established
by DLPBA. Before trying to find tools for implementing this normative
model wholly or partially, I will begin the discussion with a review of the
old, traditional halakhic modes of determining parenthood in the most
common scenarios of the ancient era – a coitally produced child and
adoption. As in all other faiths and civil jurisdictions, the halakhic
ramifications of determining parenthood are enormous and far-reaching.
The determination that a child is Jewish (and therefore, for example, entitled
to Israeli nationality under Israeli law) is based on matrilineal descent,
whereas his status of Kohen (priest), Levite or Israelite is passed down
patrilineally.13
A man who is defined as the legal father of a child must assume several
Jewish and civil parental obligations.14 In addition to fulfilling the first
11. For more about this commandment, see Gestation, supra note 1, at 120-22;
DAVID M FELDMAN, BIRTH CONTROL AND JEWISH LAW: MARITAL RELATIONS,
CONTRACEPTION, AND ABORTION AS SET FORTH IN THE CLASSIC TEXTS OF JEWISH LAW
46-50 (1968).
12. Although the secular word “status” is very important and prevalent, it is also
amorphous and difficult to define precisely because it is used in different legal fields and
contexts. For its basic meanings, see RONALD H. GRAVESON, STATUS IN THE COMMON
LAW 33-54 (1953); Carlton C. Allen, Status and Capacity, 46 L.Q. REV. 277 (1930);
Manfred Rehbinder, Status, Contract and the Welfare State, 23 STAN. L. REV. 941
(1971). For a discussion of legal parenthood as a modern status that enables individuals
to privately determine who will be regarded as the legal parent(s) of the conceived child,
see Status to Contract, supra note 9, at 94-96; Frozen Embryo Dispute, supra note 4, at
375-77.
13. For more on the importance of Jewish blood lines, see Pamela Laufer-Ukeles,
The Lost Children: When the Right to Children Conflicts with the Rights of Children, 8
J.L. & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 219, 245 (2014) [hereinafter Lost Children]. For the vast
influence of Jewish law on Israeli civil law and for a criticism of this interplay, see Ruth
Zafran, Whose Child are You? The Israeli Paternity Regulation and its Flaws, 46
HAPRAKLIT 311 (2003).
14. See AVRAHAM STEINBERG, Parents, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JEWISH MEDICAL
ETHICS: A COMPILATION OF JEWISH MEDICAL LAW ON ALL TOPICS OF MEDICAL INTEREST
772-4 (2003) [hereinafter ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JEWISH MEDICAL ETHICS]; Paternity, in 3
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JEWISH MEDICAL ETHICS, supra at 775-782.
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commandment of procreation, the Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Kiddushin
states that the father is obligated to circumcise his son, and if the son is the
mother’s first born, redeem him as part of the pidyon haben ritual, teach him
Torah and a profession, assist him in getting married, and according to
another opinion, even teach him to swim. In addition, he must maintain him
and shelter him, and provide for all his other needs. The child, on his part,
must respect and obey his father and mother, is prohibited from hitting and
cursing them, must mourn them when they die, and has the right to inherit
from them.15 Before exploring the extent to which halakhah is unique in its
approach of establishing legal parenthood almost exclusively by the “natural
order”, I wish to briefly review the basic approach of many, if not all, other
legal systems, which determine it solely by law. This major disparity is not
a modern one, but dates back to ancient times, when halakhah stood alone
in stark contrast to Roman law and its derivative – common law.
In ancient Roman law, the husband/father was the head of the family
(patria potestas [Latin: power of a father]). His wife and children were his
property and he alone decided who was to be regarded as his legal child and
thus inherit him, and who would not be defined as his legal child, even if the
child was his own biological son. In other words, the father had the social
and legal power to adopt a child and define him as his legal child and
successor.16 Later on, this approach of determining legal parenthood by law
rather than biology and/or genetics was adopted by Roman law’s successors,
mainly Common law,17 Christian law18 and Islamic law.19 In its new guise,
15. See BT Kiddushin 29a.
16. For this notion, see HERBERT F. JOLOWICZ & BARRY NICHOLAS, A HISTORICAL

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF ROMAN LAW 118, 119 (1972); John Crook, Patria
Potestas, 17 THE CLASSICAL QUARTERLY 113 (1967); Walter Kirkpatrick Lacey, Patria
Potestas, in THE FAMILY IN ANCIENT ROME: NEW PERSPECTIVES 121 (Beryl Rawson ed.,
1987).
17. See JENNY TEICHMAN, ILLEGITIMACY: AN EXAMINATION OF BASTARDY 72-73
(1982). For a discussion of illegitimacy from a Jewish perspective, see Regulating ART,
supra note 1, at 424-30. See generally HARRY D. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND
SOCIAL POLICY (1971).
18. See MERRY WIESNER-HANKS, CHRISTIANITY AND SEXUALITY IN THE EARLY
MODERN WORLD: REGULATING DESIRE, REFORMING PRACTICE 153 (2010); JOHN WITTE,
THE SINS OF THE FATHERS: THE LAW AND THEOLOGY OF ILLEGITIMACY RECONSIDERED
62-63 (2009).
19. See generally Ebrahim Moosa, The Child Belongs to the Bed: Illegitimacy and
Islamic Law, in QUESTIONABLE ISSUE: ILLEGITIMACY IN SOUTH AFRICA (Sandra Burman
& Eleanor Preston-Whyte eds., 1992); Mudasra Sabreen, Parentage: A Comparative
Study of Islamic and Pakistani Law, 1 FRONTIERS L. RES. 21 (2013). To obtain a sense
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any child conceived out of wedlock, even when there was no explicit betrayal
in the sexual act, was defined as a bastard and illegitimate, as he was not part
of a legally intact marriage (filius nullius CI?4!:S G*#!R( 9% :9=9(N/BD@ -#!6
child was indeed a child of nobody, for his biological father and mother were
not recognized as his legal parents, and he was thus deprived of all his basic
needs and rights, most importantly his right to maintenance and his ability to
inherit.20
I.

DETERMINING HALAKHIC PARENTHOOD IN THE ANCIENT ERA
A. Coitally Produced Child

Normatively speaking, if a child is born into an intact marriage in which
his two parents are Jewish and married to one another, the child is considered
their legal child,21 he can marry any Jewish woman, and he has all of the
obligations and rights that pertain to both his parents. But, if the child is born
to parents who could not be married at the time of his conception, because
their marriage was prohibited by the Torah and would be regarded as invalid
according to halakhah, or alternatively, when a married woman has sexual
relationships with another Jew, the offspring is regarded as a mamzer
(bastard).22 The mamzer remains the legitimate child of his parents (as
opposed to being regarded as an illegitimate child in other religions and legal
systems), and therefore still has the right to be maintained by them, to carry
their family name, and to inherit from them after their death. He and all his
of the extent to which this problem is still relevant today, see Christian Reus-Smit,
International Crises of Legitimacy, 44 INT.L POL. 157 (2007); Symposium, The New
'/00>;787&-#%+( 4>37:iting Why Parentage Should Not Depend on Marriage, 20 AM. U.
J. GENDER SOC. POL.Y & L. 349-701 (2012).
20. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 458,
459 (1962); Richard H. Helmholz, Support Orders, Church Courts, and the Rule of Filius
Nullius: A Reassessment of the Common Law, 63 VA. L. REV. 431, 446-48 (1977); Mary
K. Kisthardt, Of Fatherhood, Families and Fantasy: The Legacy of Michael H. V. Gerald
D., 65 TUL. L. REV. 585, 587-95 (1991).
21. For an elaboration of this issue, see Ruth Halperin-Kaddari, Redefining
Parenthood, 29 CAL. W. INT.L. L.J. 313, 316-17 (1999); Pinhas Shifman, The Status of
the Unmarried Parent in Israel Law, 12 ISR. L. REV. 194, 194-95 (1977).
22. See Ben Zion Schereschewsky, Mamzer, in THE PRINCIPLES OF JEWISH LAW,
423-30 (Menachem Elon ed., 1975); Lost Children, supra note 13, at 242-45. For the
concept and importance of purity and holiness that should be part of the conjugal
relationship, see Regulating ART, supra note 1, at 413-16. For a social anthropological
criticism of the politics of mamzerut, see SUSAN M. KAHN, REPRODUCING JEWS: A
CULTURAL ACCOUNT OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION IN ISRAEL 78-80 (2000).
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descendants, however, cannot marry a Jewish woman unless she herself is a
mamzer or proselyte. If a child is born to a single mother who is legally able
to be married to the father but did so only after the child was conceived, the
child is halakhically legitimate, as he was born to married parents, and he
does not face the stigma of bearing the status of mamzer.23 In the latter
scenario involving a single mother, where the putative father denies his
paternity, there are no halakhic constraints to proving the genetic connection
by means of a paternity test.
Similarly, there is no validity to any private agreement between the parents
to release the man from his paternity, even if they signed a contract to the
effect that he is not to be regarded as the halakhic father of the conceived
child. But, in the case of a married woman, where there is concern that any
inquiry into the true genetic connection may result in the possibility that the
child will be labeled a mamzer, extensive halakhic efforts are made to avoid
this conclusion to preserve the child’s basic right not to suffer the stigma of
being labeled a mamzer.24 This religious-civil desire to avoid declaring a
child a bastard (mamzer) in the Jewish-Israeli context is reflected in some of
Israel’s civil laws as well as in Israel’s Population Registry Law, 5725-1965
§ 22, which dictates that “Save under a judgment of a competent civil or
religious court, a man shall not be registered as the father of the child of a
woman who had been married to another man within 300 days prior to the
date of the birth of the child” (the author’s own translation). The meaning
of this legislation is that under such circumstances, legal paternity cannot be
registered in Israel’s population registry following a declaration of the parties
due to the halakhic problem of being regarded a mamzer. In this unique case,
only a court decree may permit this registration, taking into consideration,
amongst other things, the BIC and the far-reaching Jewish and civil
consequences of such a problematic registration.25
Similarly, and unique to Israeli civil law, is concern over the possibility of
23. See Schereschewsky, supra note 22, at 424-29.
24. For the difference between determining legal paternity when the child is born to

a single mother and to a married mother, a difference that is well-rooted also in Israeli
civil law, see Ruth Zafran, More Than One Mother: Determining Maternity for the
Biological Child of a Female Same-Sex Couple – the Israeli View, 9 GEO. J. GENDER &
L. 115, 119 n.13 (2008). For parallel secular efforts not to define a child as illegitimate,
as the marital presumption, see Traci Dallas, Rebutting the Marital Presumption: A
Developed Relationship Test, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 369, 379-87 (1988); Theresa Glennon,
Somebody’s Child: Evaluating the Erosion of the Marital Presumption of Paternity, 102
W. VA. L. REV. 547, 563 (2000).
25. See Zafran, supra note 24, at 153-54.
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bastardy should paternity tests be conducted on a regular basis for minors,
whether Jewish, Christian or Muslim.26 That is the reason why the Genetic
Information Law, 5761-2000, following its amendment in 2008, states that a
paternity test is allowed only by court order. A paternity test may be
conducted only after receiving explicit permission from the child’s chief
religious authority and must be reaffirmed by the attorney general, ensuring
that there is no fear of bastardy in this case, which would obviously be
detrimental to the BIC, and which was bitterly criticized in the scholarly
literature.27 As can be deduced from the above discussion, the rule of thumb
in halakhah, and subsequently in Israeli civil law,28 is that legal paternity is
determined almost solely on the basis of genetics and the natural order,
without taking into account the legal definition of the parents’ marital status.
Of course, one of the major exceptions to this is the fear of the mamzer status,
as explained above, in addition to other social-halakhic exceptions, as I will
explore in section 4.29
B.

Adoption

Adoption, one of the most well-known parent-child relationships, is
deeply rooted in ancient common law, and is still prevalent today. Judaism’s
attitude towards adoption is ambivalent at best, and hostile at worst.30 This
26. For a secular Israeli call to conduct paternity tests on a regular basis to avoid any
ambiguity concerning the putative father’s identity, see Talia Agmon, Genetic Testing of
Children – Why Not? Questions Regarding the Legislation on Genetic Testing of
Children in Israel, 6 L. & BUS. 295 (2007).
27. For the English version of the law, but unfortunately without the relevant 2008
amendment no. 3, see Genetic Information Law, 5761-2000*, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBRARY,
https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Health/GeneticInformationLaw.pdf, (last
visited June 23, 2018); see also Shahar Lifshitz, Neither Nature nor Contract: Toward
an Institutional Perspective on Parenthood Essay, 8 J. L. ETHICS & HUM. RTS. 297, 305
(2014).
28. For this contention concerning the Israeli system’s rule of thumb, see Zafran,
supra note 24, at 118-19; Gestation, supra note 1, at 104-5.
29. For a brief discussion of halakhic exceptions which ignore the basic theme of
nature and genetic as the sole factor in establishing legal paternity, see Michael Corinaldi,
The Legal Status of a Child Born of Artificial Means from a Sperm Donor or an Egg
Donor, 18-19 SHNATON HA-MISHPAT HAIVRI 295, 304-8 (1992-4); ZOHAR, supra note 1,
at 69-71, 74-76 (concluding that “– the affirmation of biological parenthood and the
concomitant invalidation of parenthood by consent reflect a value-commitment rather
than an inevitable necessity”); Zohar, supra note 1, at 82; Status to Contract, supra note
9, at 250-52.
30. See generally BRIAN MILNE, RIGHTS OF THE CHILD: 25 YEARS AFTER THE
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ambivalence has its roots in biblical sources, where there are many verses in
both the Pentateuch and the Prophets that can be interpreted as referring to a
form of adoption, but all are so vague as to be unreliable for serving as a
cornerstone for any ancient recognition of this legal mechanism.31 Even later
on, in the Tannaitic and Amoraic literature, only aggadic and non-halakhic
sources endorse the adoption of a Jewish child by a foreign Jewish couple.
For example, there is a midrash about a guardian who married off the female
orphan he raised as his own child. When asked her father’s name for
recording in her marriage contract, she remained silent for a while and then
replied, “he that brings up a child is called a father, not he that begets . . . .”32
Adoption involves three groups of people – the adopted child; the adopting
parents, who are usually infertile and have no other opportunity to become
parents; and the natural parents, who often decide to give away their own
child because of economic constraints. But, practically speaking, throughout
the ages, the only factor which Jewish halakhic authorities have taken into
account in deciding whether to authorize an adoption has been the BIC.33 If
ADOPTION OF THE UN CONVENTION (2015); KERRY O’HALLORAN, THE POLITICS OF
ADOPTION: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE 78-80
(2015); HEIDI SCHWARZWALD ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ADOPTION AND CLINICAL
PRACTICE (2015).
31. For a detailed discussion of those verses, see Encyclopedia Judaica: Adoption,
JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBRARY, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/judaica/ejud_
0002_0001_0_00486.html, (last visited June 23, 2018). For a more general description
of various biblical parent-child relationships, see JOSEPH FLEISHMAN, FATHERDAUGHTER RELATIONS IN BIBLICAL LAW 6-9, 136-39 (2011).
32. And similarly, “Whoever brings up an orphan in his home, it is as though he gave
birth to him,” BT Sanhedrin 19b. See also MICHAEL GOLD, AND HANNAH WEPT:
INFERTILITY, ADOPTION, AND THE JEWISH COUPLE 153-61 (1988).
33. For the superiority of this doctrine in secular law and in Jewish law, see JOSEPH
GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1979); JOSEPH
GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1980); JOSEPH
GOLDSTEIN ET AL., THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: THE LEAST DETRIMENTAL
ALTERNATIVE (1996); Michael J. Broyde, Child Custody in Jewish Law: A Pure Law
Analysis, JEWISH L. ASS’N. STUD. VII: PARIS CONF. VOLUME 1 (2002); Yehiel S. Kaplan,
Child Custody in Jewish Law: From Authority of the Father to the Best Interest of the
Child, 24 J.L. & RELIGION 89, 121 (2008). For reservations with regard to this theme in
the Jewish context, see Israel Z. Gilat, Is the ‘Benefit of the Child’ a Major Criterion
according to Jewish Law in a Parental Conflict of the Child?, 8 BAR ILAN L. STUD. 297
(1990). For the interplay between this doctrine and the religion of the adopted child, see
Laura J. Schwartz, Religious Matching for Adoption: Unraveling the Interests Behind
the “Best Interests” Standard, 25 FAM. L.Q. 171, 185-89 (1991); Daniel Pollack et al.,
Classical Religious Perspectives of Adoption Law, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 746-47

https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol26/iss2/1

10

Margalit: Towards Establishing Parenthood by Agreement in Jewish Law

2018]

ESTABLISHING PARENTHOOD BY AGREEMENT

657

the BIC requires that a child be removed from his natural home, i.e. when a
child has been orphaned, abandoned, or neglected by his natural parents, he
may be adopted by others. The child was never treated as goods to be handed
from his parents to others, but rather as an independent, autonomous person
whose natural or adoptive parents have the duty, and not the right, to care for
him and fulfill all his needs. Even after he is adopted by others, his natural
and legal relationship with his natural family is never actually abolished.
Even a superficial glance at the Jewish literature that deals with adoption
clearly shows the extent to which Judaism prefers natural parenthood and
genetic lineage over any social and/or psychological parenthood of adoptive
parents.34 In social or psychological parenthood, an individual can be
determined as a legal parent, despite not being the biological parent of the
child. While some halakhists recognize to this institution, it is safe to assume
that the vast majority reject such recognition and hold that “adoption is not
known as a legal institution in Jewish law.”35 That is because in Jewish law,
and therefore also in Israeli civil law,36 legal parenthood is defined as natural
parenthood, and no implied or explicit agreement, or even a judicial decree
and legislation can change this axiom.37 The only possible recognition in
(2004).
34. In the modern context, the doctrine of social and/or psychological parenthood is
used to establish or terminate legal parenthood and/or resolve any dispute with the natural
parents over child custody. See Carolyn Curtis, The Psychological Parent Doctrine in
Custody Disputes Between Foster Parents and Biological Parents, 16 COLUM. J.L. &
SOC. PROBS. 149, 192 (1980); Vanessa L. Warzynski, Termination of Parental Rights:
The “Psychological Parent” Standard, 39 VILL. L. REV. 737, 770-71 (1994); Peggy
Cooper Davis, The Good Mother: A New Look at Psychological Parent Theory, 22
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 347, 369-70 (1996).
35. See Encyclopaedia Judaica: Adoption, supra note 31; GOLD, supra note 32, at
157; Gestation, supra note 1, at 104, 122-23.
36. For a list of several prominent Israeli Supreme Court verdicts that support the
notion that legal parenthood is defined as natural parenthood, see Lifshitz, supra note 27,
at 299 n.5.
37. That is the reason why Israel’s 1981 Adoption of Children Law §16 defines the
adoption relationship as, “the adoption ends the obligations and rights between the
adopted child and his parents and the rest of his family and the authority given to them
over him . . . .” This means that the adoption law does not permanently and totally
terminate the natural lineage of the adopted child’s natural family and does not establish
a full and new relationship with his adoptive family, due to halakhah’s basic premise
that the new lineage cannot fully substitute the natural one. For an overview of Israeli
adoption regulations and the massive influence of Judaism on it, see Zafran, supra note
24, at 131-35; Gestation, supra note 1, at 104, 123-28.
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adoption is the recognition, to varying degrees, of the new relationship as
additional and supplemental to the still-existing natural lineage, but not fully
replacing it.38
What is crucial for the continuation of our discussion is the fact that even
those who hold that adoption cannot sever the adopted child’s natural lineage
with his natural parents are likely to agree that there is enough room in
halakhah for regarding the adoptive parents as at least “semi-parents.” There
is a possible Talmudic precedent for a legal guardian (apotropos)39 to be
recognized as the child’s legal parent. This legal recognition involves many
parental obligations and rights that are similar to those of the natural parents,
as I will discuss again in the conclusion of this article. Another option for
granting recognition to adoptive parents is to entrust the administration of
the child’s property to the adopter, which places the child in the same
position as the adopter’s natural children, and includes his right to be
maintained by the heirs after the adopter’s death. The latter option is only
relevant to financial obligations, while the former includes a wider range of
parental responsibilities, such as taking responsibility for the child’s physical
and mental welfare.40
In the age-old traditional approach of halakhah, it is possible to divorce
your spouse by mutual agreement, but it is impossible to “divorce” your child
that has been adopted in the modern era according to some secular legal
thinkers.41 For example, one radical feminist maintains that the vertical
parent-child relationship should be regarded as the pillar of the modern
family because the horizontal spousal relationship has become too weak and
shaky as a result of the skyrocketing divorce rate. Alternatively, there is the
38. ALEX J. GOLDMAN, JUDAISM CONFRONTS CONTEMPORARY ISSUES, 63-73 (1978);
Mark Goldfeder, The Adoption of Children in Judaism and in Israel; A Conceptual and
Practical Review, 22 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 321, 353 (2014).
39. BT Bava Kama 39a-40a, 44b; BT Bava Metzia 38a, 39a-b, 42b; BT Bava Batra
42a, 131b-132a. For the institution of the apotropos in Jewish law, see Ben Zion
Schereschewsky, Apotropos, in THE PRINCIPLES OF JEWISH LAW 219, 221-22
(Menachem Elon ed., 1975); Charla Murakami, Parent-Child Relations: A Comparison
of Jewish and California Law, 1 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 107, 109-15 (1995);
Kenneth B. Orenbach, The Religiously Distinct Director: Infusing Judeo-Christian
Business Ethics Into Corporate Governance, 2 CHARLOTTE L. REV. 369, 403-4 (2010).
40. For an overview of these two options, see Encyclopaedia Judaica: Adoption,
supra note 31. For apotropos as an alternative to adoption, see Gestation, supra note 1,
at 104, 124.
41. For a unique secular exception and for the option of divorcing one’s parents, see
Kingsley v. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d 780, 790 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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child-centered approach, whereby the BIC rather than parental rights should
be the central factor in day-to-day family life.42
II. DETERMINING HALAKHIC PARENTHOOD IN THE MODERN ERA
A. General
The Jewish nation as a whole, and Israeli society in particular, hold
childbearing in high esteem for historical, religious, demographic, and
security reasons.43 To begin with, this is the first biblical commandment for
every Jew, and the Talmud states that the messiah will come when all the
unborn souls are born.44 The tragedy of the Holocaust, which destroyed a
third of the Jewish nation, the fragile and problematic security and
demographic situation in the Middle East, where the Jewish state is
surrounded by enemy states that have repeatedly gone to war against it,
coupled with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, create a strong desire in Jewish
and Israeli society to “fill the void.”
The above phenomenon has been referred to as Jewish and Israeli
pronatalism, that is, the encouragement of procreation, childbearing and an
emphasis on the advantages of raising children.45 Moreover, since
procreation is one of the central Jewish commandments and a socio-religious
taboo, the other side of the coin is the sad situation of infertile individuals or
couples. Numerous articles and books have been written about the sensitive
status of those who are infertile and how to overcome it.46 The cry of the
42. See MARTHA A. FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND

TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 118-19 (1995); Barbara B. Woodhouse,
Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parents’ Rights, 14 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1747, 1754-71 (1993).
43. See Fundamental Principles of Jewish Law in Relation to Technological
Advances, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JEWISH MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 14, at 586-92. For
the general Jewish ethic, especially concerning childbirth, see Jewish Ethics, in 2
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JEWISH MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 14 at 380-89; Child Birth, in 1
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JEWISH MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 14 at 166-94.
44. See BT Nida 13b.
45. For this notion and for a survey of its main causes and ramifications, see
Yeheakel Margalit, Scarce Medical Resources – Parenthood at Every Age, In Every Case
and Subsidized By the State?, 9 NETANYA ACAD. COLL. L. REV. 191, 193-207 (2014)
[hereinafter Scarce Medical Resources]; Lost Children, supra note 13, at 220-24, 23440.
46. See Gideon Weitzman, Give Me Children or else I am Dead: Orthodox Jewish
Perspectives on Fertility, in FAITH AND FERTILITY: ATTITUDES TOWARDS REPRODUCTIVE
PRACTICES IN DIFFERENT RELIGIONS FROM ANCIENT TO MODERN TIMES 205, 262 (Eric
OTHER
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barren biblical Rachel to the !5?C>5C$@ 45$#3- )B>;E 'E $@>7"CE%- #C 6 A@577
">E-0 (@>$@ ?@E A5BEA >%?EC!CE?E" ?# 'E5% ?@5? 5 $@>7"7EAA !ECA#% >A 5$$#=%?E"
as blind and even dead, has echoed down through the generations, and it is
only now that advanced bio-medical innovations offer some comfort for
those in this situation.47
2@>7E $7E5C7& ?@E 5";E%? #D )%E(0 5AA>A?E" CE!C#"=$?>#% ?E$@%#7#B>EA1)/<80) have successfully solved many fertility problems, these
technologies have also threatened and even endangered the Jewish
bionormative perceptions of proper and desired spousal and parental
structures.48 When you unravel the Gordian knot that used to exist between
marriage, sexuality, and procreation, and add a third player to the dual
spousal conjugal relationship * such as a sperm and/or ova donor and/or
surrogate mother * the necessity for marriage decreases.49 I will argue later
on that at the end of the day this is the real reason why some halakhists have
strongly opposed ART, even in the very justified scenario of using the
@=A35%".A A!EC' ?# 5C?>D>$>577& >%AE'>%5?E @>A (>DE,
B.

Artificial Insemination by Husband (AIH)

The most prevalent, and seemingly less controversial and simplest ART,
>A ?@E =AE #D ?@E @=A35%".A A!EC' ?# >'!CEB%5?E @>A (>DE, :E%EC577&
speaking, there are a variety of types of artificial insemination.50 The
Blyth & Ruth Landau eds., 2009); RICHARD V. GRAZI, BE FRUITFUL AND MULTIPLY:
FERTILITY THERAPY AND THE JEWISH TRADITION (1994); RICHARD V. GRAZI,
OVERCOMING INFERTILITY (2005).
47. See Genesis 30:1; BT Nedarim 64b. See also Gideon Weitzman, Technology in
the Service of the First Mitzvah, 6 9+AKIRAH, FLATBUSH J. JEWISH L. & THOUGHT 259
(2008).
48. For a discussion of this threat and the general interplay of ART and the
)?C5">?>#%570 5%" )%E(0 D5'>7&- see Radhika Rao, Assisted Reproductive Technology and
the Threat to the Traditional Family, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 951, 964 (1996); John A.
Robertson, Assisted Reproductive Technology and the Family, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 911,
927-8 (1996).
49. See generally Jonathan B. Pitt, Fragmenting Procreation, 108 YALE L.J. 1893,
1896-7 (1999); Deborah H. Wald, The Parentage Puzzle: The Interplay Between
Genetics, Procreative Intent, and Parental Conduct in Determining Legal Parentage, 15
AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL.Y & L. 379, 381 (2007). For the Jewish perspective on
fragmenting sex and procreation and for a feminist critique of it, see RONIT IRSHAI,
FERTILITY AND JEWISH LAW: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON ORTHODOX RESPONSA
LITERATURE 25-200, 203-75 (Joel A. Linsider trans., 2012) [hereinafter FERTILITY AND
JEWISH LAW].
50. See Brent J. Jensen, Comment, Artificial Insemination and the Law, 1982 BYU
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artificial insemination process involves the injection of sperm into a
woman’s cervix. The procedure may be done either by a licensed physician
in an official medical facility or by the woman, at home. Homologous
insemination occurs when the husband donates the sperm that is injected into
his wife. Homologous insemination is alternatively known as artificial
insemination by the husband, hereinafter “AIH”. It has been applied
successfully since at least the eighteenth century.
From the early 1930s, the possibility that a woman could be fertilized not
in the “old fashioned way” ushered in a new era in which thousands of
children were born by this procedure. It is most relevant when the husband’s
sperm is medically problematic or when he must undergo medical treatment
that will impair or carry a risk of impairing his ability to procreate.51
Although this simple “technology,” prima facie, does not involve any
particular ethical or legal problems, in the conservative Victorian era it was
regarded as adultery and the child was stigmatized as a bastard or
illegitimate. Slowly but surely, the approach to this procedure changed, and
today all societies recognize that its advantages outweigh its disadvantages.52
Thus, unless there is reason to suspect that the husband’s sperm will be
mixed with, or intentionally or even unintentionally replaced by, someone
else’s sperm, it should be permitted. Nonetheless, the Catholic Church is its
strongest opponent, maintaining that any human involvement in the most
intimate and divine process of procreation is prohibited. It views any such
human involvement as “playing God” and hubris, and demands that it be
completely banned.53 This stringent Catholic approach towards ART has
been regarded by some as naturalism, that a human being may not interfere
L. REV. 935, 935-37 (1982).
51. See AIH, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JEWISH MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 14, at 5873; DANIEL B SINCLAIR, JEWISH BIOMEDICAL LAW: LEGAL AND EXTRA-LEGAL
DIMENSIONS 68–76 (2003).
52. For a description of the shift from regarding this procedure as problematic and
worthy of rejection to more accepted and legitimate, see WILFRED J. FINEGOLD,
ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION 56-75 (1964); Gaia Bernstein, The Socio-Legal Acceptance of
New Technologies: A Close Look at Artificial Insemination, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1035,
1060 (2002); Status to Contract, supra note 9, at 77-80.
53. See U.S. CATHOLIC CONFERENCE, CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE
FAITH, DONUM VITAE: INSTRUCTION ON RESPECT FOR HUMAN LIFE IN ITS ORIGIN AND ON
THE DIGNITY OF PROCREATION 7 (1987); Shultz, supra note 7, at 329-30. For the approach
of Islamic law, which generally permitted AIH with certain precautionary measures,
similar to the Jewish approach, see VARDIT RISPLER-CHAIM, ISLAMIC MEDICAL ETHICS
IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 18-27, 204 (1993).
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in the divine desire and destiny that a given believer will or will not have
children.
One of the most fascinating halakhic aspects of this issue is the old,
traditional approach of dealing with the status and consequences of a child
who was conceived in non-coital reproduction. There is a discussion in the
Talmud of the possibility of a virgin conceiving after bathing in a bathtub in
which a man had previously ejaculated.54 Similarly, there is a parallel
aggadic source which states that Ben-Sira was simultaneously the son and
the grandson of Jeremiah, as his daughter was impregnated by Jeremiah’s
sperm after he was forced to ejaculate in the water of a bathhouse.55 Later
on, in the thirteen century, Peretz ben Elijah of Corbeil, in his halakhic work
Haggahot Semak, cautions married woman not to lie on the bedsheets of a
man who is not her husband, for fear that the man may have ejaculated on
them. The reason was that if she became pregnant, no one would know that
the fetus is not that of her husband, and there is concern that the child might
marry his biological sister.56 It may be deduced from these more or less
reliable sources that even though a child is conceived by his father’s sperm
in non-coital reproduction, he is nonetheless regarded as his legitimate child
and probably in every respect.
This old and deep-rooted halakhic tradition fits the basic natural order that
a child is the legal son of his biological progenitor.57 While some halakhists
even hold that the father fulfills his biblical, or at least rabbinic, obligation
to procreate58 via artificial means, there is still a minority of rabbinic
authorities who argue that a child conceived by artificial means, such as AIH,
should not be treated as the biological son of his father.59 There are a number
54. See BT Hagigah 14b-15a.
55. See Joshua H. Lipschutz, To Clone or Not to Clone--A Jewish Perspective, 25 J.

MED. ETHICS 105 (1999); Daniel B. Sinclair, Assisted Reproduction in Jewish Law, 30
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 71, 79 n.31 (2002).
56. See Regulating ART, supra note 1, at 430-31.
57. This is also common sense and is well-accepted in other jurisdictions. See
Regulating ART, supra note 1, at 435 (explaining that in cases of AIH no question of
paternity has ever been raised in American law).
58. For a discussion of this, see Regulating ART, supra note 1, at 436-37. For a
general scholarly discussion of fulfilling this commandment by means of the various
ART procedures, see FERTILITY AND JEWISH LAW, supra note 49, at 25-52.
59. This is in addition to other possible halakhic problems concerning the prohibition
of destruction of the seed, see FELDMAN, supra note 11, at 109. There are additional
concerns of replacing the husband’s sperm with someone else’s sperm and turning
childbearing into a ‘mechanical’ act, as claimed in IMMANUEL JAKOBOVITS, JEWISH
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of formalistic justifications for this determination, but I would argue that they
are based on meta-halakhic60 considerations rather than hard core halakhah.
These considerations incline towards some form of Christian naturalism, or
soft naturalism,61 and they conceptualize ART as a threat to the Jewish
bionormative family structure, therefore even prohibiting AIH, the simplest
form of such artificial treatments.
One of the most effective theological methods for reinforcing the
prohibition against artificial treatments and maintaining the concept of
naturalism, which prohibits procreation by non-natural means, is to define
this procedure as illegitimate. One of the main ramifications of this sad
conclusion is that the conceived child is defined as an orphan, or “a child of
no one,” and is not the legitimate child of his biological progenitors. One of
the most important conclusions to be drawn from this discussion is that
halakhah should apply its capacity to disengage itself from its basic approach
– that a child is defined as its parents’ child only if the child is the parents’
biological child – in view of other halakhic considerations. In section 4, I
will discuss some additional halakhic exceptions to the natural order.
C.

Artificial Insemination by Donor (AID)

When artificial insemination involves using a donor’s sperm without the
woman having a sexual relationship with the donor, it is referred to either as
heterologous insemination or artificial insemination by donor, (“AID”).62
This procedure is performed when the husband is infertile for physiological
or psychological reasons. Some halakhic authorities even sanction this
procedure in the case of single or lesbian women, or when sperm
enhancement/eugenics is necessary.63 While AID is the most common ART
MEDICAL ETHICS: A COMPARATIVE AND HISTORICAL STUDY OF THE JEWISH RELIGIOUS
ATTITUDE TO MEDICINE AND ITS PRACTICE 248-49 (1959). For addressing and refuting all
the above-mentioned concerns, inter alia, because of the husband’s intention to procreate
and not to discard his sperm, see Sinclair, supra note 51, at 68-76.
60. For a discussion of this notion, see Alexander Kaye, Eliezer Goldman and the
Origins of Meta-Halacha, 34.3 MODERN JUDAISM 309 (2014).
61. For the notion of halakhic naturalism and for casting doubt on whether halakhah
does indeed channel parenthood into a true natural order, see Sinclair, supra note 51, at
68-76; ZOHAR, supra note 1, at 69-78.
62. See Browne Lewis, Two Fathers, One Dad: Allocating the Paternal Obligations
Between the Men Involved in the Artificial Insemination Process, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 949, 957-58 (2009). For a more comprehensive definition of the various artificial
insemination procedures, see GOLDMAN, supra note 38, at 74-86.
63. See AIH, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JEWISH MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 14, at 58-
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procedure, it perhaps constitutes the most direct and troubling conflict
between the secular and halakhic concepts of who should be recognized as
the legal father of the conceived child.
I believe that this conflict is the reason why in modern-day Israel, AID
regulation remains the only law concerning the determination of legal
parenthood that is lacking, after the 1996 surrogacy law and the 2010 eggs
donation laws were enacted. The background for this inevitable clash
between halakhah and Israeli civil law is the fact that, on the one hand,
according to civil law the entire point of AID legislation is to release the
sperm donor from any parental obligations and rights. This release occurs at
the expense of transferring the donor’s legal fatherhood to the husband of the
inseminated woman, who intended and agreed, for all intents and purposes,
to become the legal father of the resulting child. Halakhah, on the other
hand, clings to its fundamental notion of natural parenthood, which means
that an agreement between two people cannot change the basic concept that
legal fatherhood is determined according to the biological father.64
There is an extensive early discussion about whether the above procedure
renders the resulting child a mamzer. The dispute is rooted in the
interpretation given to the somewhat vague biblical prohibition of placing a
man’s seed in the womb of another person’s wife. The verse states, “And
you shall not lie carnally for seed with your neighbor’s wife.”65 It is unclear
whether this prohibition is due to the illicit sexual relationship that
traditionally precedes the placing of a stranger’s seed in a married woman’s
womb or whether the issue is the problematic outcome of placing a man’s
seed in a strange woman, even without engaging in any prohibited sexual
intercourse. The clear distinction between these two interpretations finds
expression in modern ART, in which a stranger’s sperm can be placed in the
cervix of the donee without their engaging in any problematic sexual
relationship.66 In his stringent approach, Yoel Teitelbaum regards this as
73.
64. See Gestation, supra note 1, at 130-31 (“Most significantly, despite decades of
use in Israel, a national law has not been passed in Israel to regulate AID due in part to
significant objection to such a procedure by the Jewish law authorities in Israel.”). For
a description of this inevitable clash, see Pinhas Shifman, Establishing Parenthood for a
Child Born through Artificial Insemination, 10 HEBREW U. L.J. 63, 65-77 (1980); Zafran,
supra note 24, at 121-23; Artificial Means, supra note 29. For aspects of the erosion of
natural parenthood in AID, see Lifshitz, supra note 2li7, at 306-10.
65. Leviticus 18:20. For an overview of the possible interpretations of this
prohibition, see SINCLAIR, supra note 51, at 82-83.
66. For a discussion of the claim that most sources endorse the former interpretation,
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adultery per se and therefore, like any other adulterous relationship, it is
completely prohibited. According to Moshe Feinstein’s lenient approach, on
the other hand, as long as there is no prohibited relationship between the
donor and the donee, the method does not pose any particular halakhic
problem; the resulting child can marry any Jewish woman and this artificial
means has no negative implications for him.67
I will now focus on the major dilemma of who is to be regarded as the
legal father of the conceived child. Should it be the sperm donor, as
prescribed by natural lineage?68 Or are there perhaps other halakhic
considerations which can change this determination, such as, on the one
hand, conferring legal fatherhood on the donee’s husband or, on the other
hand, releasing the donor from his legal paternity, thus leaving the child
without any legal father? The vast majority of halakhists maintain that
paternity should be determined by the natural order in the AID context as
well, thus making the sperm donor the legal father of the resulting child in
all respects.69 This dichotomous determination produces two additional
major problems.
Practically speaking, the sperm donor’s anonymity calls into question the
legitimacy of the conceived child, as there is no guarantee that the donor
himself is not a mamzer, in which case the resulting child will also be
stigmatized as such. Moreover, since the donor’s identity is unknown, the
conceived child is defined as a shtuki, or a “possible mamzer.” On the one
hand, a shtuki is prohibited from marrying a female mamzer since he himself
might not be a mamzer; on the other hand, he cannot marry a “regular”
woman, as there is a chance that he may indeed be a mamzer. The only
option available to him is to marry a woman who has converted to Judaism.70
see MENACHEM ELON, JEWISH LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 626 (1999). For the
disturbing consequences of the latter interpretation, see Lost Children, supra note 13, at
247.
67. For a summary of these arguments as well as for a review of the other halakhic
justifications for prohibiting this practice, see Regulating ART, supra note 1, at 422-24;
Sinclair, supra note 51, at 77-94.
68. For a summary of the views of those authorities who claim that the sperm donor
should be regarded as the legal father of the child in all respects, see Regulating ART,
supra note 1, at 436-37.
69. Others contend that legal fatherhood is determined only for stringent
considerations (“lechumra”), such as the prohibition against biological siblings
marrying, and not for rights, such as inheritance rights. See the sources listed in SINCLAIR,
supra note 51, at 90 nn. 81-82.
70. See KAHN, supra note 22, at 55; Lost Children, supra note 13, at 244-45. For the
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In addition, there is the problem of unintentional incest. If the sperm donor
donated his sperm to a number of sperm banks, there is the possibility that a
brother might unwittingly marry his sister, not knowing that they are
biological siblings.71 This problem is far more serious in Israel, in which
there are only seventeen accredited sperm banks in the entire country.72
These two major problems can be resolved by more careful and thorough
regulation of the entire sperm donation process. Maintaining adequate
records and/or conducting accurate registries that list and document the
identities of both donors and donees will go far to alleviate these two grave
concerns. In 2010, Israel enacted a new Egg Donation Law which launched
the establishment of a complete confidential registry with the identifying
information of both egg donors and donees to avoid any problems of
mamzerut.73 In my opinion, this constitutes the first urgently required step in
resolving the drawbacks of donating anonymous gametes. There is no choice
but to allow a representative of the rabbinical courts to access this registry
before any artificially conceived child marries, to ensure that incest does not
occur.74
Alternatively, an even better, but very surprising and even ironic, solution
is to use the sperm of non-Jewish donors. There is a halakhic fiction of
nullifying the seed of a gentile, which means that, halakhically, a gentile
donor’s sperm and descendants are not regarded as belonging to him. The
outcome of this astonishing determination is that biological siblings born
form a Gentile’s sperm are not defined as siblings and thus there is no
assertion the majority of halakhists hold: that AID is prohibited for a married woman
and that there is no authoritative opinion that permits using the sperm of a Jewish donor,
see Gestation, supra note 1, at 130-31.
71. See my previous caveat that AID should be completely abolished if it turns out
that it has marked negative effects on the children conceived by these artificial means.
Such halakhic problems can fuel this cry, see Status to Contract, supra note 11, at 99100.
72. One of the Israel’s foremost IVF experts recently told me that while there is no
official regulation of the sperm donation process, there is a new non-official, selfregulation ethic that restricts the possible number of donations to only two to three live
births from the same donor.
73. For those two suggestions, see Lost Children, supra note 13, at 249-51;
SINCLAIR, supra note 51, at 90.
74. For the media news that the Israeli Health Ministry Regulations from 2008 Guidelines for the Administration of Sperm Donation of the Ministry of Health, Nov. 8,
2007 (to be effective June 1, 2008), to some extent contemplated these problems, see
Lost Children, supra note 13, at 251 n.137.
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problem of incest in the unlikely eventuality that they should marry.
Similarly, there is no problem of the child being a mamzer or a shtuki, as
those problems relate only to Jewish sperm.75 In 2015, an Israeli rabbinical
court rendered an explicit ruling that a child who was artificially conceived
with non-Jewish sperm is to be regarded as a legitimate child, and the child
is even eligible to marry a priest (Kohen).76
But let us return to the dilemma at hand: Are there any halakhic
considerations that could change the determination that the sperm donor
should be regarded as the legal father of the resulting child? Let us recall
those halakhic authorities, mentioned above in the discussion of AIH, who
argue that the artificialness of the process should change the basic approach
of halakhah to natural parenthood, and the conceived child should not be
determined as the legal child of his biological progenitor. That should apply
in the case of AID as well, where the “donor” “donated” his sperm and
received full payment in return for his “donation.”77 Thus, philosophically
and halakhically, the donor has abandoned his sperm and has in fact
disconnected himself from his genetic material, which therefore is no longer
considered his, and the resulting child is no longer to be treated as his son
for all intents and purposes.78
The most interesting and important discussion, however, revolves around
the possibility of halakhah conferring, to varying degrees, legal fatherhood
on the donee’s husband. If we could find accepted halakhic tools in this
regard, we would be able to resolve, if even partially, the major problem of
bridging the gap between the secular and religious conceptions of who
should be determined as the legal father of the conceived child. This
conferring of legal fatherhood on the donee’s husband is of course a very
problematic option, as, prima facie, it contradicts the natural order of
determining legal fatherhood. This option was considered decades ago in

75. See Lost Children, supra note 13, at 252 (discussing the advantages and
disadvantages of this determination).
76. See File No. 1051202/1 Rabbinical Court (Ashkelon), Anonymous (Nov. 1,
2015), http://www.daat.ac.il/daat/psk/psk.asp?id=1278 (in Hebrew) (Isr.).
77. In Israel, the average payment for a single sperm donation is approximately NIS
700-750, the equivalent of $180 each.
78. See MOSES MAIMONIDES, THE GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED 1:72 (Chaim Rabin
trans., 1995); Mordechai Halperin, The Definition of Parenthood and the Right to Find
Biological Roots, in MORAL DILEMMAS IN MEDICINE 161, 167 (Raphael Cohen-Almagor
ed., 2002); Menachem M. Kasher, Artificial Insemination, 1 NOAM 125, 125-26 (1958).
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the Haifa rabbinical court.79 In that AID case, the court ruled that the donee’s
husband had agreed to his wife’s insemination, and is therefore obligated to
pay the resulting child’s support, because by agreeing to the insemination,
he became a guarantor (arev) of the donee and must therefore pay the child’s
maintenance.
The most important AID ruling of Israel’s civil Supreme Court was based
on the precedent of the above rabbinical court decision to obligate the
donee’s ex-husband to continue paying child support even after they had
separated because of his initial oral agreement.80 Based on this precedent,
one may again deduce that halakhah has its own tools for deviating from the
natural order of bestowing legal paternity purely on the grounds of genetics
and for recognizing, to varying degrees, the donee’s husband, even if only
for monetary purposes, as I will explore more extensively in section 5. As
mentioned earlier, in section 4 I will list some additional circumstances in
which halakhah deviated from natural to intentional parenthood as a basis
for supporting this essential compromise between the civil and religious legal
systems.
D.

Egg Donation

Egg donation is intended to enable women who are unable to conceive
with their own ova, but can gestate a fetus to term, to give birth to children
by receiving egg donations from other women. In assisted reproduction, egg
donation typically involves in vitro fertilization (“IVF”) technology,
whereby the eggs are fertilized in a laboratory with the husband’s sperm or
with donated sperm. After fertilization, the fertilized egg is implanted in the
womb of either the donee or a surrogate mother. The typical donation is a
commercial one in which an anonymous donor agrees that, for monetary
consideration, her ovum may be used by an anonymous donee. The donee
79. See Rabbinical Court (Haifa), Anonymous v. Anonymous (July 21, 1977)
(unpublished), discussed in CA 449/79 Salameh v. Salameh 34(2) PD 779, 782 (1980)
(Isr.). Unfortunately, this unique precedent was later overruled on appeal, inter alia, on
the grounds of semi-adultery. See File No. App. 49/5745 High Rabbinical Court (Jer),
Anonymous (Dec. 16, 1985) (unpublished). For discussions of this problematic ruling,
see Pinhas Shifman, Family Law in Israel: The Struggle Between Religious and Secular
Law, 24 ISR. L. REV. 537, 543 n.31 (1990); Gestation, supra note 1, at 130-31. It is pity
that the long-term consideration of discouraging couples from using AID overrode the
short-term consideration of providing child maintenance, which badly affected the BIC.
80. See CA 449/79 Salameh (1980). For a discussion of this precedent, see Lifshitz,
supra note 27, at 299 n.10.; Amos Shapira, Normative Regulation of Reproductive
Technologies in Israel, 13 NOVA L. REV. 609, 611-12 (1989).
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is the gestational mother but not the genetic mother.81 Nowadays, the use of
egg donations has become very common and is employed in a variety of
circumstances: married couples; lesbian couples, where one spouse donates
her egg to her female partner, and after the egg has been fertilized by a
donor’s sperm, this partner carries the fetus to term; handicapped single
women who wish to bring a child into the world, using a triple donation –
egg, sperm and surrogacy.
The Latin dictum mater est quam gestatio demonstrat (motherhood is
demonstrated by gestation)82 traditionally expressed the fact that in the past,
before the advent of ART, the three basic compontents of motherhood – the
genetic
contribution,
the
gestational
contribution
and
the
social/psychological contribution – overlapped in the same woman. This
axiom was so strong, that legislators and courts have assumed that the
woman who gives birth is obviously always the mother of the conceived
child in all the above aspects of motherhood, and there was no need for this
axiom to be anchored either in legislation or a judicial decree.83 But, the first
test tube baby, Louise Brown, who was born in northern England in 1978,
and the advent of egg donations, unraveled this Gordian knot into its three
basic components, and totally blurred this simple working premise.84 Today,
the dilemma of who should be determined the legal mother of a child
conceived by egg donation has become a very concrete, sensitive and
confusing issue. Should the egg donor be regarded as the legal mother due
to her enormous influence on the child’s genetic makeup and perhaps even
on his behavioral character,85 or should the gestational mother be regarded

86.

81. See IVF, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JEWISH MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 14, at 571-

82. See Rita D’alton-Harrison, Mater Semper Incertus Est: Who’s Your Mummy?,
22 MED. LAW REV. 357, 359 (2014).
83. See U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, INFERTILITY:
MEDICAL AND SOCIAL CHOICES 282 (1988); Unif. Parentage Act, Art. 3, 9B U.L.A. 287,
298 (1973).
84. For what is perhaps Judge Marianne O. Battani’s most well-known statement –
“We really have no definition of ‘mother’ in our law books . . . ‘Mother’ was believed to
have been so basic that no definition was deemed necessary,” see Smith v. Jones, No.
85-53201401 (Mich. Cir. Ct. March 14, 1986), discussed in Scott B. Rae, Parental Rights
and the Definition Of Motherhood in Surrogate Motherhood, 3 S. CAL. REV. L. &
WOMEN’S STUD. 219, 223 (1994).
85. For the reason to prefer the genetic contribution over the gestational contribution,
see Richard F. Storrow, Parenthood by Pure Intention: Assisted Reproduction and the
Functional Approach to Parentage, 53 HASTINGS L. J. 597, 603-22 (2002); Yehezkel
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as the legal mother, as a result of her critical contribution in bearing him to
term and her massive influence on him during the pregnancy?86
Despite this acute and confusing dilemma, and despite the great similarity
between egg donation and sperm donation in terms of the mechanism they
use and their merits and drawbacks, egg donation has not generated much
intensive discussion in the contemporary scholarly literature.87 In my
opinion, this is either because this dilemma has merged with the broader and
more complicated issue of establishing legal motherhood in surrogacy, or
perhaps, because it is similar to sperm donation in that the accepted
conclusions for determining the legal father can be applied in the above
circumstance as well.88 In stark contrast to the paucity of the discourse in
academic circles, the Jewish legal literature contains several relevant
Talmudic discussions dating back to the fifth century. Thus, the
determination of who should be regarded as the legal mother can be deduced
only from several related, theoretical, and mainly aggadic, sources. For
example, the Talmud states that there are three partners in the creation of a
fetus – the Almighty and the two parents. While the Almighty supplies the
spirit, the father supplies the “semen of the white substance,” out of which
all the white organs – “the child’s bones, sinews, nails, the brain in his head
and the white in his eye” – are formed, and his mother supplies “the semen
of the red substance out of which are formed the child’s skin, flesh, hair,
blood and the black of his eye.”89 This means that the mother’s contribution
Margalit, The Rise, Fall and Rise Again of the Genetic Foundation for Legal Parentage
Determination, 3 J. HEALTH L. & BIOETHICS 125 (2010) [hereinafter Genetic
Foundation].
86. For legislative, judicial and academic references that endorse the gestational
component, see UPA § 201(a)(1), 9B U.L.A. 309 (2001); Andres A. v. Judith N., 591
N.Y.S.2d 946, 948 (NY Fam. Ct. 1992); George J. Annas, Redefining Parenthood and
Protecting Embryos: Why We Need New Laws, 14 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 5, 50-51 (1984);
MARSHALL H. KLAUS, MATERNAL-INFANT BONDING 1-15 (1976); Anne Goodwin,
Determination of Legal Parentage in Egg Donation, Embryo Transplantation, and
Gestational Surrogacy Arrangements, 1992 FAM. L.Q. 275, 277-79 (1992).
87. For the lack of any comprehensive discussion of this dilemma, see Lynn M.
Squillace, Too Much of a Good Thing: Toward a Regulated Market in Human Eggs, 1 J.
HEALTH & BIOMED. L. 135 (2005); Kenneth Baum, Golden Eggs: Towards the Rational
Regulation of Oocyte Donation, 2001 BYU L. REV. 107, 123 (2001); Anne Schiff
Reichman, Solomonic Decisions in Egg Donation: Unscrambling the Conundrum of
Legal Maternity, 80 IOWA L. REV. 265, 271 (1995).
88. See Bridging the Gap, supra note 6, at 52-49.
89. See THE JEWISH FAMILY, supra note 2, at 155.
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to the resulting child’s makeup is similar to that of the male’s, and thus grants
her legal motherhood.90
On the other hand, there are halakhic sources that tend to recognize the
gestational rather than the genetic mother as the preferred legal mother. The
Talmud relates to Mordechai who took Esther as his foster daughter and
inquires into the meaning of the redundancy in the verse, “For she had neither
father nor mother and when her father and mother died . . . .” On the surface,
the verse appears to be telling us twice that Esther was orphaned from both
parents. What is the meaning of this repetition? “Rav Aha said: When her
mother became pregnant with her, her father died; when she was born, her
mother died.” Rashi explains, “When her mother became pregnant, her father
died – leaving her fatherless from the time it would have been fit to call him
‘father’. And when her mother bore her, she died – and was not (ever) fit to
be called ‘mother.’”91 In other words, Esther was “totally” orphaned: from
the very first moment that she could have had a father – the conception – he
passed away, and from the very moment that she could have had a mother,
the mother too died. Literally, this means that while conception determines
halakhic fatherhood, gestation establishes motherhood.92
After the advent of IVF and the birth of the first test tube baby, the halakhic
discourse became far more extensive. Until these amazing bio-medical
innovations made their appearance, there had been no dilemma whatsoever,
as all three maternal components completely overlapped. It was only with
the advent of IVF, egg donation and surrogacy that, for the first time in
Jewish history, halakhic authorities had to confront a situation wherein the
90. See BT Niddah 31a (concluding that the parallel genetic raw material of both the
mother and the father should be the main factor in establishing halakhic parenthood was
supported by important contemporary poskim).
91. See Esther 2:7; BT Megillah 13a. This conclusion is not entirely logical, as the
redundancy can easily be explained as simply providing the accurate timing of when she
was taken to her foster home, which was when her father and mother died.
92. For a fuller discussion of the various Talmudic sources, such as the plant grafting
case; a fetus is part of its mother’s body; the twin brothers case; the aggadaic tale
concerning the interchanged fetuses, the fetus’ ownership and inheritance rights etc., see
Regulating ART, supra note 1, at 463-80; Gestation, supra note 1, at 107-10. For the
inevitable conclusion that there is no definite consensus in the Talmud as to who should
be regarded as the legal mother, see Ezra Bick, Ovum Donations: A Rabbinic Conceptual
Model of Maternity, in JEWISH LAW AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 83, 89
(Emanuel Feldman & Joel B. Wolowelsky eds., 1997) (“were there to exist absolutely
no Talmudic guidance for our question, neither in halakhic or aggadic sources”);
Gestation, supra note 1, at 105 (“there is no official singular ruling on the matter that can
be derived from the Talmud”).
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genetic component had been separated from the gestational one. One of the
key characteristics of Jewish law is the major importance of halakhic
tradition, and in these new circumstances, it was sorely missing. Moreover,
even halakhah’s traditional adherence to the natural order was confusing in
this dilemma, as what is the natural order in this case – the gestational or the
genetic component? In this circumstance, natural lineage is thus blurry and
useless. Furthermore, due to the far-reaching ramifications of the legal
determination of halakhic maternity, coupled with the halakhic and
sociological sensitivities of this issue, all of the options for determining
halakhic maternity are open. Until recently, it was commonly assumed that
the majority of halakhic decisors regarded the gestational mother as the legal
mother93 and only a minority held the genetic mother to be the legal mother.94
In recent years, however, there has been a distinct shift in this regard, and
today the opposite is true – the majority of halakhic decisors lean towards
defining the genetic rather than the gestational mother as the legal mother.
Furthermore, according to two minority opinions, both mothers should be
regarded as the legal mother – the concept of dual maternity.95 Others argue
93 . For an exhaustive overview of the different opinions updated to 2010 that reach
this conclusion, see Bridging the Gap, supra note 6, at 244-45; SINCLAIR, supra note 51,
at 103 n.126. See also the following definitive conclusion from almost 15 years ago:
“Jewish law, for the most part, has endorsed the criteria of birth as the defining factor of
motherhood” Gestation, supra note 1, at 94. For several seminal English and Hebrew
sources that endorse the gestational mother as the legal mother, see Michael J. Broyd,
The Establishment of Maternity and Paternity in Jewish and American Law, 3 NAT’L
JEWISH L. REV. 117, 131-40 (1988); Ezra Bick, Ovum Donations: A Rabbinic Conceptual
Model of Maternity, 28 TRADITION 28 (1993) and the other sources listed in Gestation,
supra note 1, at 105 n.106; SINCLAIR, supra note 51, at 103-06. For a more specific
discussion of distinguishing parturition from gestation and which one is the superior
factor in determining the gestational mother as the legal mother, see Regulating ART,
supra note 1, at 461 n.277; J. David Bleich, In Vitro Fertilization: Questions of Maternal
Identity and Conversion, in JEWISH LAW AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES
46, 49-52 (Emanuel Feldman & Joel B. Wolowelsky eds., 1997).
94. For the sources that endorse determining the genetic mother as the legal mother,
see Regulating ART, supra note 1, at 482 (“By contrast, the genetic factor is absolutely
clear and definite, creating the strongest biological bond between the genetic mother and
the child. A mother’s parent-child relationship is most likely based upon a clear and
definite factor.”). See also Gedalia Orenstein, In Vitro Fertilization – Lineage of the
Child and Fulfilling the Mitzvah of Procreation, 24 TECHUMIN 156, 159 (2004). For other
Hebrew sources that endorse determining the genetic mother as the legal mother, see
Gestation, supra note 1, at 106-07 especially n.107.
95. For this unique notion of Jewish dual maternity, see David J. Bleich, In Vitro
Fertilization: Questions of Maternal Identity and Conversion, 25 TRADITION 82 (1991).
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that neither should be designated the legal mother, due to the artificial nature
of the process, which means that at least officially, the conceived child is
unrelated to both parents.96 I myself am not aware of any similar halakhic
shift in such a short period of time, especially with regard to an issue that is
so sensitive and important. Thus, there appears to be no agreed determinative
factor in establishing halakhic maternity.
This indeterminate situation produces two important intertwined
observations for the continuation of our discussion. First, the fact that there
is no clear determination as to who should be recognized as the legal mother
makes it much easier to confer halakhic validity on a surrogacy agreement.
This is because it is less problematic to transfer halakhic maternity from the
gestational mother to the intended mother, who is also the genetic mother, as
both of them may be determined the legal mother, than it is to make the
dichotomous determination that only the gestational mother can be
recognized as the legal mother, where she, and not the genetic mother, is the
only one who can be determined as such.
Second, since there are two possible factors in establishing legal
maternity – genetic and gestational – there is more room for applying
my normative model of DLPBA in determining halakhic maternity.
Therefore, for a better understanding of the possible implications of
determining maternity, I will now explore the surrogacy arrangement
and how the concept of intentional parenthood is applied in transferring
legal motherhood from the gestational mother to the genetic mother.
E.

Surrogacy

One of the most ancient and reliable sources that documents the practice
of surrogacy is the Bible. In the era of the patriarchs and matriarchs, it was
common for the mistress of the house to give her female slave to her husband
For a discussion and refutation of this conclusion, see SINCLAIR, supra note 51, at 10608; Regulating ART, supra note 1, at 481-82 (“In the absence of evidence, this theory
cannot be considered in determining a mother’s parental status under Jewish law.”).
96. See, for example, the following harsh statement – “Even for a creature such as
this that is the object of our discussion, that is formed and takes shape in a place where
there is no relation [and likewise in this context, where the entire pregnancy was
conceived in a test tube, as if the child is an orphan from both father and mother] and it
pertains even more so to our case . . . ,” ELIEZER Y. WALDENBERG, 15 RESP. TZITZ
ELIEZER ch. 45 (1984); Yitzhak A. Liebes, Regarding Limb Transplants, 14 NOAM 28
(1971). For the history of this statement, see Gestation, supra note 1, at 106 n.108. For a
broader exploration and a refutation of this stringent approach, see SINCLAIR, supra note
51, at 95-102.

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law,

27

American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [], Art. 1

674

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 26:2

for the purpose of having the conceived child regarded as that of the
mistresses. This arrangement was practiced by both barren and fertile
women, as demonstrated in the cases of Sara and Hagar, and Leah, Rachel
and their maidens, Bilhah, and Zilpah.97 Whereas Sara and Rachel were
infertile and were compelled to use their slaves to procreate, Leah also gave
her slave to her husband, despite being fertile and bearing children of her
own. That the mistress was recognized as the legal mother, and not the slave,
can be deduced from the fact that it was the former rather than the latter who
named the resulting offspring.98
In the modern era, surrogacy basically means that the surrogate mother
receives a fertilized ovum from the intended parents and, through a surrogacy
agreement, agrees to carry the fetus to term and hand the child over to the
intended parents immediately after the delivery. There are two types of
surrogacy – traditional and gestational. In traditional surrogacy, the surrogate
mother provides two components of motherhood – the genetic material of
the ovum and the gestational contribution.”99 “The gestational surrogate
provides only one component of motherhood: the gestational contribution.”
Both types of surrogacies may be either commercial or altruistic. In
commercial surrogacy, monetary consideration generally incentivizes the
surrogate mother. In altruistic surrogacy, the surrogate mother is generally
motivated by a desire to help desperate infertile couples.100
97. See Genesis 16:1-4; 30:1-13. For a summary of these biblical surrogacy stories,
see JULIA J. TATE, SURROGACY: WHAT PROGRESS SINCE HAGAR, BILHAH, AND ZILPAH!
(1994). For the claim that the story of Sara and Hagar is actually the first story of a crossborder reproduction service, see DAPHNA HACKER, LEGALIZED FAMILIES IN THE ERA OF
BORDERED GLOBALIZATION 117-148 (2017).
98. As was claimed by PINHAS SHIFMAN, FAMILY LAW IN ISRAEL Vol. 2 158 n.74
(1989). But, of course, this conclusion is problematic, as the notion of biology, with
regard to both genetics and gestation, and the surrogate mother’s contribution, was not
known in the ancient era. Moreover, in any event the fact that the maid is her master’s
possession infers that even her child belongs to them and not to her. For a more general
rejection of the analogy between modern surrogacy and the biblical stories, and for the
claim that biblical surrogacy bears little resemblance to contemporary surrogacy
arrangements, see Richard Storrow, “The Phantom Children of the Republic”:
International Surrogacy and the New Illegitimacy, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y &
L. 561, 609 (2012).
99. See Yehezkel Margalit, In Defense of Surrogacy Agreements: A Modern
Contract Law Perspective, 20 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 423, 426 (2014); see also
Dominique Ladomato, Protecting Traditional Surrogacy Contracting Through Fee
Payment Regulation, 23 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 245, 247 (2012).
100. See Yehezkel Margalit, From Baby M to Baby M(anji): Regulating International
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Following the discussion on egg donation above, the main halakhic issue
in a typical gestational surrogacy is who should be designated the legal
mother J the intended mother, who is also the genetic mother, or the
surrogate mother because of her gestational contribution. There are
numerous other halakhic-ethical issues in these sensitive and complicated
arrangements. First and foremost is the legality, validity and enforceability
of these agreements. Other halakhic-ethical issues include: lack of concern
%97 4#' #26=?:(.6 G879*7'?4!9:?R !:%!('R!4N/ ?:( 4#' ':(976';':4 9% ;?R'
reproductive freedom; termination of the parent-child relationship;
transferability of custody rights; a non-87987!'4?7N ?$7'';':4< G=?=N
6'RR!:$/< ':%97*'?=!R!4N 9% ?: !RR'$?R act; neglect of duties by the surrogate
mother; and execution of a transaction regarding an object not yet in
existence.101 Last but not least, even if we validate the surrogacy
arrangements, there is an acute need to take necessary precautionary
measures to protect the surrogate mother from any unwarranted inducement,
coercion, exploitation and so on, in addition to other intrinsic internal
contractual problems, such as the unequal power of the contracting parties,
change of heart, and changed circumstances.102
A general criticism expressed by modern scholars and feminists is that
halakhah is more concerned with enabling the male intended parent to
procreate than with the welfare and interests of the female surrogate
mother.103 They reinforce their criticism by comparing this issue with sperm
donation: Whereas halakhically it is almost impossible to transfer legal
%?4#'7#99( %79; 4#' (9:97 49 4#' (9:''.6 #26=?:(A 4#'7' !6 :9 879=R'; P!4#
transferring legal motherhood in the case of surrogacy. They claim that this
may be understood as giving preference to the male fulfillment of the
obligation to procreate over the welfare and the vulnerability of the surrogate
mother.104 In my opinion, the main issue was, and remains, the determination
Surrogacy Agreements, 24(1) J.L. & POL.Y 41, 45 (2016)@
101. See ZOHAR, supra note 1, at 80; Regulating ART, supra note 1, at 449-58.
102. For an exploration of these problems and a refutation of them one by one
following modern contract theory, see Frozen Embryo Dispute, supra note 4.
103. For an up-to-date overview of this critique, see FERTILITY AND JEWISH LAW,
supra note 49, at 264-68. For the statement that generally there is a shift in halakhah
concerning IVF and surrogacy from moral rejection to qualified legal acceptance, see
SINCLAIR, supra note 51, at 103. See generally FERTILITY AND JEWISH LAW, supra note
49, at 25; Ronit Irshai, Toward a Gender Critical Approach to the Philosophy of Jewish
Law (Halakhah), 26 J. FEMINIST STUD. IN RELIGION 55 (2010); INBAR REVEH, FEMINIST
REREADINGS OF RABBINIC LITERATURE (Kaeren Fish trans., 2014).
104. See also Lost Children, supra note 13, at 238 E64?4!:$A G4he importance of genetic
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of who should be regarded as the legal mother of the resulting child, due to
the far-reaching ramifications of this determination. The claim that halakhah
has no concern for the welfare and interests of the surrogate mother is oversimplistic and an over-generalization.
Moreover, the comparison and subsequent criticism between sperm
donation and surrogacy, may be justified with regard to the earlier
determination by the majority of poskim (halakhic decisors) that the
surrogate mother should be recognized as the legal mother. However, in view
of the above-mentioned shift in the majority opinion of contemporary
halakhic authorities that the intended genetic mother should be designated
the legal mother, it is far less problematic to transfer legal motherhood from
the surrogate mother to the intended mother, as quite often the intended and
the genetic mothers are the same. This conclusion is logical, because in the
vast majority of cases this woman is also married to the intended and genetic
father, which means that, in fact, the two intended parents are the genetic
parents.
Therefore, a priori, there is no particular problem in determining the
intended parents, who in most cases are also the genetic parents, as the legal
parents of the resulting child. In my opinion, and as I explained briefly at
the end of the previous subsection, since there is no definitive halakhic
determination as to who should be designated the legal mother in cases of
IVF and surrogacy, there is more room for applying DLPBA as a means for
recognizing the intended and genetic mother as the legal mother due to her
initial agreement to serve as the legal mother of the conceived child. This
enables both of the intended parents to fulfill, to varying degrees, their
halakhic obligation to procreate and to receive their parallel civil parental
rights.
III. DETERMINING HALAKHIC PARENTHOOD IN THE FUTURISTIC ERA
The history of bio-medical innovations clearly demonstrates the speed
with which yesterday’s science fiction has become today’s reality and how
current complicated dilemmas, such as how to determine the legal
reproduction outweighed according to such scholars (important Rabbinical authorities –
Y.M.) is the woman’s legal status as mother”). See generally Gestation, supra note 1, at
94 (“identifying the birth mother as the legal mother has not prevented a number of
prominent Jewish law authorities from condoning gestational surrogate motherhood
agreements . . . sublimating the woman’s rights for the sake of the biological father and
his wife . . . ignor[ing] the rights of the surrogate mothers because of patriarchal
considerations.”).
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parenthood of artificially conceived children, will be dwarfed by much more
confusing and challenging futuristic dilemmas. In the previous subsection
on establishing legal maternity, I explored how the halakhic natural order of
motherhood determination becomes blurred when the genetic and the
gestational components are separated. Presumably, such issues will become
far more complicated even in the foreseeable future when we are confronted
with the newest advanced bio-medical developments.105 Whereas in an
article written in 2010, I explored the rise, fall and rise again of the genetic
component in determining legal parentage, in 2014, in light of recent
innovations, I presented a comprehensive elaboration of the recent fall of the
genetic component as the most clear-cut, solid and easily proven
component.106 I summarized it as follows:
. . . these innovations require a more nuanced view of the roles of
biology and intent in determining parentage. For example, where a
child is created by way of complex genetic engineering, resulting
in a child who possesses genetic material from several individuals,
there is little guidance in the law as to whether biology should
trump intent, which of the genetic contributors should be deemed
parents, and how to delineate the various rights and obligations of
the parties.107
The inadequacy of natural order is obvious in multiple parentage

105. For some future directions of halakhah concerning cloning, cytoplasmic transfer,
nuclear transfer and oocyte cryopreservation, see Joel B. Wolowelsky & Richard V.
Grazi, Future Directions, in RICHARD V. GRAZI, OVERCOMING INFERTILITY 425-40
(2005).
106. See Genetic Foundation, supra note 85, at 125; Yehezkel Margalit & John Loike,
The New Frontier of Advanced Reproductive Technology: Reevaluating Modern Legal
Parenthood, 37 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 107, 136-39 (2014).
107. See Margalit & Loike, supra note 106, at 111.
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scenarios108 – when conception can be engineered109 from more than two
parents, and even up to six different genetic male donors; or conversely,
when it can be engineered from male or female genetic contributions, using
an artificial womb rather than a human womb.110 Alternatively, the option
of human reproductive cloning,111 makes it possible to create a child with the
108. See (Tel-Aviv family court) 14-03-37745 Nili in re the Minors A. and B. V.
Alon (not published, 27.04.14); Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob, 923 A.2d 473, 477-78 (Pa. Super.,
2007); A.A. v. B.B., [2007] 220 O.A.C. 115, 14 (Can.); J.R. v. L.R., 902 A.2d 261, 26166 (N.J. 2006); In re Jesusa V., 85 P.3d 2, 6 (Cal. 2004); In re Nicholas H., 46 P.3d 932,
935 (Cal. 2002); LaChappelle v. Mitten, 607 N.W.2d 151, 157 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000);
T.D. v. M.M.M., 730 So.2d 873, 874-75 (La.1999); State v. Mendoza, 481 N.W.2d 165
(Neb. 1992); Smith v. Cole, 553 So.2d 847 (La.1989); Ritesh R Jaiswal, Three Parent
IVF / Three Parent Baby, THE SCIENCE (Feb. 19, 2015), http://thescience.co.in/tag/threeparents-ivf/; Nancy E. Dowd, Multiple Parents/Multiple Fathers, 9 J. L. FAM. STUD. 231,
231-32 (2007); Melanie B. Jacobs, Why Just Two? Disaggregating Traditional Parental
Rights and Responsibilities to Recognize Multiple Parents, 9 J. L. FAM. STUD. 309, 31214 (2007); Padmini Cheruvu, Three-Parent IVF and Its Effect on Parental Rights, 6
HASTINGS SCI. &, TECH. L.J. 73, 75-76 (2014); Jacques Cohen & Mina Alikani, The
Biological Basis for Defining Bi-Parental or Tri-Parental Origin of Offspring From
Cytoplasmic and Spindle Transfer, 26(6) REPRODUCTIVE BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 535,
535-36 (2013), http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S147264831300134X;
Michael Legge et al., Numerical Identity: The Creation of Tri-Parental Embryos to
Correct Inherited Mitochondrial Disease, 126(1385) N.Z. MED. J. 71 (2013).
109. See Sarah Pritchard, Why the UK Should be Leading the Discussion on Embryo
Engineering, BIONEWS 834, (Nov. 1, 2016), http://www.bionews.org.uk/page_603809.
asp.; Yehezkel Margalit & John Loike, Follicular Transplants and Motherhood
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author); Kristine S. Knapland, Synthetic Cells,
Synthetic Life, and Inheritance, 45 VAL. U. L. REV. 1361, 1361-62 (2011); Michael J.
Broyde, Genetically Engineering People: A Jewish Law Analysis of Personhood, 13 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 877, 878-79 (2001).
110. See Jessica H. Schultz, Development of Ectogenesis: How Will Artificial Wombs
Affect the Legal Status of a Fetus or Embryo?, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 877, 877 (2010);
Gregory Pence, What’s So Good About Natural Motherhood? (In Praise of Unnatural
Gestation), in ECTOGENESIS: ARTIFICIAL WOMB TECHNOLOGY AND THE FUTURE OF
HUMAN REPRODUCTION 77, 77 (Scott Gelfand & John R. Shook eds., 2006); Hyun Jee
Son, Artificial Wombs, Frozen Embryos, and Abortion: Reconciling Viability’s Doctrinal
Ambiguity, 14 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 213, 214-15 (2005); Fred Rosner, In Vitro
Fertilization, Surrogate Motherhood, and Sex Organ Transplants Symposium:
Reproductive Rights, 25 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1669, 1669-70 (1991-2).
111. See Human Cloning, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JEWISH MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note
14, at 509-73; Michael Broyde, Cloning People: A Jewish Law Analysis of the Issues, 30
CONN. L. REV. 503, 508-10 (1998); Dena S. Davis, Religious Attitudes toward Cloning:
A Tale of Two Creatures, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509, 510 (1999); Elliot N. Dorff, Human
Cloning: A Jewish Perspective, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 117, 118-19 (1998); Jessica S.
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genetic contribution from one gender, without using any seed or ovum. But,
even in current advanced bio-medical practice, the insufficiency of the
natural order is clear in dealing with ovary transplantation,112 mitochondrial
donation/ replacement, stem cell technology, and uterine transplantation.113
In all these cases, the natural is no longer “natural” and relying solely on
the genetic, or even the gestational, component can easily lead to different,
and sometimes even contradicting conclusions as to who should be regarded
as the legal parent. I am confident that the following conclusion, written
almost one-and-a half decades ago with regard to the dilemmas raised by
AIH, AID, IVF, and surrogacy is far more applicable to upcoming
biomedical challenges: “In the biomedical context, however, the fast pace of
scientific technological development has produced a situation in which there
is simply not enough purely legal material upon which to base halakhic
decisions.”114 Therefore, I feel confident that implementing my normative
model, DLPBA, may be very helpful also to halakhic authorities in
establishing or determining legal parenthood, as they struggle to discover
what the “natural” order should be in these imminent breathtaking
Sackin, The Halakhic/Constitutional Argument for Human Reproductive Cloning in
America, 7 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 627, 630-32 (2009); Stephen J. Werber, Cloning: A
Jewish Law Perspective With A Comparative Study Of Other Abrahamic Traditions, 30
SETON HALL L. REV. 1114, 1114-17 (2000).
112. See Edward Reichman, The Halakhic Chapter of Ovarian Transplantation, 31(1)
TRADITION 31, 33 (1998); Zvi Ryzman, A Halachic Discussion of Ovarian Transplants
(2009),
http://olamot.net/sites/default/files/ratz_katzvi/pdf/Ovarian%20Transplants.pdf; Sherman J. Silber, Judaism and Reproductive Technology, 156 CANCER
TREATMENT RES. 471 (2010); Richard V. Grazi & Joel B. Wolowelsky, On Foetal Ovary
Transplants 40 LE’ELA (1995), http://www.daat.ac.il/daat/english/ethic/transplants_1.
htm.
113. See Rebecca Dimond, Social and Ethical Issues in Mitochondrial Donation,
115(1) BRIT. MED. BULL. 173, 174 (2015), http://bmb.oxfordjournals.org/content/115/1/
173.short - corresp-1; Caroline Jones & Ingrid Holme, Relatively (im) Material: Mtdna
and Genetic Relatedness in Law and Policy, 9:4 LIFE SCIENCES, SOCIETY AND POLICY
(2013),
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/2195-7819-9-4#page-1;
Masahito
Tachibana et al., Towards Germline Gene Therapy of Inherited Mitochondrial Diseases,
493(7434) NATURE 627, 627 (2013), http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v493/n7434/
abs/nature11647.html. See also J. David Bleich, Mitochondrial DNA Replacement: How
Many Mothers, 48(4) TRADITION (2015); Akiva Dershowitz, Triple Parent IVF, TVUNAH
(last visited June 26, 2018), http://en.tvunah.org/2013/12/29/triple-parent-ivf/. An Israeli
expert committee, the Mor-Yossef Commission, arrived at a similar conclusion, that due
to the minute influence of mitochondrial DNA on a fetus’ genetic makeup, the former
woman rather than the latter one should be determined as the legal mother.
114. See SINCLAIR, supra note 51, at 112.
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developments. As I concluded previously:
Examining the crucial role of intent where a child has multiple
biological parents demonstrates that validating the intent of the
parties should play a larger role in the more common surrogacy
context of three biological parents . . . we argue that, where the
biological paradigm is insufficient . . . The benefits of using
contractual/intentional parenthood in traditional ART are also
present in the context of advanced ART.115
IV. ADDITIONAL HALAKHIC EXCEPTIONS TO NATURAL LINEAGE
In the previous section, I explored the inadequacy and insufficiency of
both the genetic and gestational halakhic natural order as the sole means for
establishing legal parenthood. I therefore suggested adding DLPBA to the
equation to assist poskim to re-conceptualize the “natural order” in
confronting futuristic complicated dilemmas and challenges. In section 5, I
will elaborate on how halakhah can adopt my innovative proposal by moving
from the traditional and “natural” order of establishing legal parenthood
towards a more nuanced, sensitive and delicate order that involves some
aspect of intentional parenthood.
But first, I will briefly explore some additional halakhic exceptions to the
natural order, besides the above main exception of an artificially conceived
child, especially one born by means of AID,116 who, according to some
poskim, is not recognized as the legal descendant of his progenitors despite
the fact that their reproductive material brought him into the world.117 The
unique exceptions presented below demonstrate the extent to which
halakhah has its own devices for ignoring natural-biological reality and uses
various halakhic-sociological justifications to determine that other persons
are the legal parents of a given child. In my opinion, if halakhah wishes to
retain its massive influence and, more importantly, its relevance in this
steadily and rapidly developing field, the already existing exceptions are of
great importance for building the required legal infrastructure, and for
answering the urgent need for finding halakhic precedents for any new
halakhic issue.

115. See Margalit & Loike, supra note 106, at 138.
116. See YOSI GREEN, PROCREATION IN THE MODERN ERA: LEGAL AND HALACHIC

PERSPECTIVES 155-8 (2008). See, e.g., Kasher, supra note 78, at 126.
117. See generally Moshe Sternbuch, Test-Tube Baby, 8 BI’SHVILEI HA’REFUAH 29,
30 (1987); Ezra Bick, Surrogate Motherhood, 7 TECHUMIN 266, 270 (1986).
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The Jewish Presumption of Paternity118

As in Christianity and Islam, there is a presumption in halakhah that any
child conceived in an intact marriage is the legal child of the husband. The
reason behind this well-known marital presumption of the husband’s
paternity in halakhah was to protect the BIC and his welfare from the harsh
consequences of being labeled an illegitimate child or mamzer.119 The
presumption that a child is conceived by the husband and not as a result of
infidelity is well-rooted in the Amoraic period in the Talmud and also in the
authoritative halakhic codices, and is particularly difficult to negate. This
presumption is so strong that halakhically it is applied also in the case of a
mother who is a prostitute, where it is reasonable to assume that the father of
her child is one of her clients. But if she was “too involved” in sexual
relationships with her clients instead of her husband, there is no choice but
to realize that it is impossible that the child still be assumed to be the
biological son of his father, and he is labeled an illegitimate child/mamzer.120
This presumption is a good illustration of my claim that given a good
halakhic-sociological justification, halakhah can depart from its traditional
reliance on the natural order and totally ignore genetic truth and biological
reality to achieve a much more desirable and less harsh determination.
B.

Annulment of the Lineage of Gentile Sperm121

As mentioned earlier,122 there are distinct advantages to using Gentile
rather than Jewish sperm to avoid problems of incest and “possible
mamzer”/shtuki status. Halakhah does not validate intermarriage with a nonJew. Moreover, in intermarriage, the child resulting from the conjugal
118. For an initial and partial overview of those exceptions, see ZOHAR, supra note 1,
at 69-71, 74-76; Artificial Means, supra note 29, at 304-8; Status to Contract, supra note
9, at 250.
119. See Linda L. Chezem & Sarah L. Nagy, Judicial Abrogation of a Husband’s
Paternity: Can a Third Party Seek to Establish Paternity over a Child Born into a
Marriage While That Marriage Remains Intact, 30 IND. L. Rev. 467, 468-69 (1997);
Paula Roberts, Truth and Consequences: Part I. Disestablishing the Paternity of NonMarital Children, 37 FAM. L.Q. 35, 35-37 (2003); Diane S. Kaplan, Why Truth is Not a
Defense in Paternity Actions, 10 TEX. J. WOMEN , &, L. 69, 70-71 (2000); Brenda J.
Runner, Protecting a Husband’s Parental Rights When His Wife Disputes the
Presumption of Legitimacy, 28 J. FAM. L. 115, 115 (1989-1990).
120. See 24 TALMUDIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 131-48 (Slomo Y. Zevin et al. eds., 1999).
121. Lost Children, supra note 13, at 18.
122. Id.
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relationship is not defined as the legal offspring of his father but only of his
mother. Thus, if the father is Jewish and the mother is not, the child, because
of being regarded as the child of his mother, is defined as a non-Jew, and
vice versa, if the mother is Jewish and the father is not, again the child is not
recognized as the child of his Gentile father.
This determination ignores natural reality and halakhically annuls the
Jewish child’s genetic lineage from his non-Jewish father due to a fictional
determination in which the Torah “forfeits” the semen of a Gentile and, from
the perspective of Judaism, his offspring are not defined as his legal children.
One scholar recently noted that this principle is applied also in the context of
adoption, where many poskim indicate a clear preference for adopting nonJewish babies over Jewish babies, for fear of incest, which could lead to
mamzerut.123 Moreover, this preference for Gentile sperm or a Gentile child
contradicts one of Judaism’s most basic principles – preserving the Jewish
bloodline.124
C. Annulment of Lineage in a Proselyte
Like the principle discussed in the previous subsection, halakhic
annulment of a Gentile’s genetic lineage also occurs when he converts to
Judaism. The Talmud states several times that a proselyte is like a newborn,
thus completely severing all of his former familial relationships despite the
fact that the biological relationships still exist.125 Therefore, according to the
Written Law, after his conversion a proselyte can even marry his mother or
sister, and he does not inherit his biological parents. But the Oral Law
restricts these two problematic consequences, as it is unfitting that what is
prohibited before his conversion – incest – is permitted afterwards. For
similar reasons, it is unfitting to prevent him from inheriting his biological
parents. With the exception of these two situations, the convert is totally
severed from all his previous familial relationships. Once again, halakhah
totally ignores the natural order because of other important halakhic-

123. Id. at 20.
124. See Shlomo Z. Auerbach, Artificial Insemination, 1 NOAM 145, 166 (1958);

GREEN, supra note 116, at 169-70; Lost Children, supra note 13, at 20-25: see Regulating
ART, supra note 1, at 413-16; Ryzman, supra note 112, at 7-8.
125. See BT Yevamot 22a, 62b, 97b and parallels. For a discussion in the halakhic
codices, see MAIMONIDES, Issurei Biah 14:11; Shulhan Arukh, Yore Dea 269:10. For a
theoretical explanation of this rebirth which severs all previous familial relationships
after the conversion, see Bleich, supra note 93, at 49-50; Gestation, supra note 1, at 107.
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sociological reasons.126
D.

Annulment of Lineage in Posthumous Procreation

Posthumous procreation has recently become more common,127 at least in
Israel, where it is possible to make a “biological will” to ensure posthumous
use of one’s sperm.128 There is even a precedent for fertilizing a deceased
woman’s ovum with the sperm of her living husband and using a surrogate
mother to bring their child into the world.129 This posthumous practice may,
on the one hand, be humanity’s ultimate answer to the inevitability of an
imminent death, but, on the other hand, may also create a nightmare.130 The
various socio-ethical dilemmas of “planned orphanhood,”131 the “nonidentity problem,”132 and how to evaluate the BIC of the resulting child are
126. See BT Yevamot 97b; MAIMONIDES, Ishut 15:6; Shulhan Arukh, Even HaEzer

1:7; 6 TALMUDIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 259-62 (Slomo Y. Zevin et al. eds., 1954); Aharon

Lichtenstein, On Conversion, 23(2) TRADITION 1 (1988); ZVI ZOHAR & AVRAHAM SAGI,
GIYUR VEZEHUT YEHUDIT 227-48 (1994).
127. See GREEN, supra note 116, at 331-36, 399-419. See also Regulating ART, supra
note 1, at 437-40. For Hebrew sources that address the issue, see Gideon Weitzman,
Taking Sperm from an Unconscious Husband, 25 TCHUMIN 59, 63 (2005); Yigal Shafran,
Postmortem Fatherhood, 20 TECHUMIN 347 (2000); Yaakov Ariel et al., Postmortem
Sperm Procurement--Juridical and Halachic Aspects, 139 HAREFUAH 331 (2000);
Moshe Hershler, Test-Tube Babies According to Halakha, 4 HALAKHA & MED. 90, 92
(1985).
128. See Yael Hashiloni-Dolev, Posthumous Reproduction (PHR) in Israel: Policy
Rationales Versus Lay People’s Concerns, a Preliminary Study, 39 CULTURE, MED. &
PSYCHIATRY 634, 635 (2015); Irit Rosenblum, The Biological Will – A New Paradigm
in ART?, NEW FAMILY ORG. (Feb. 25, 2013), http://www.newfamily.org.il/en/4905/thebiological-will%E2%84%A2-%E2%80%93-a-new-paradigm-in-art/; Irit Rosenblum,
Being Fruitful and Multiplying: Legal, Philosophical, Religious, and Medical
Perspectives on Assisted Reproductive Technologies in Israel and Internationally, 36
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 627, 630 (2013). See also Lifshitz, supra note 27, at 313,
330.
129. See David Regev, Woman’s Dream to Have Child Fulfilled After Death, YNET
MAGAZINE (June 14, 2011), http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4081456,00.
html (recounting the story of Nissim Ayish, who fulfilled his late wife’s wish to become
a mother two years after she died from a deadly tumor).
130. See Devon D. Williams, Over My Dead Body: The Legal Nightmare and Medical
Phenomenon of Posthumous Conception Through Postmortem Sperm Retrieval, 34
CAMPBELL L. REV. 181, 192-94 (2012).
131. See Ruth Landau, Planned Orphanhood, 49(2) SOC. SCI. & MED. 185, 188-94
(1999).
132. See I. Glenn Cohen, Beyond Best Interests, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1187, 1208-14
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beyond the scope of this article.
I will just briefly review the opinions of poskim who maintain that any
child created after his progenitor’s death may not be regarded as the
deceased’s legal child, despite the strong connection which genetic reality
and natural order create between the child and his genetic parent.133 The vast
majority of halakhists adhere to the natural order and maintain that the
conceived child is still the legal child of the deceased, even though he was
conceived after the parent’s death. But there are some prominent poskim
who argue that in this unique scenario, the child is not defined as the legal
child of his progenitor, at least for stringent considerations (“lechumra”),
because he was born to a dead person and by artificial means. This is yet
another halakhic exception to the natural order, where halakhah ignores
genetic reality in favor of other considerations.134
E.

Annulment of Lineage When the Heir Murders his Decedent

Perhaps one of the most well-known Jewish moral dicta is the rhetorical
question, “Would you murder and also inherit?”135 This was the cry of Elijah
(2012); I. Glenn Cohen, Regulating Reproduction: The Problem with Best Interests, 96
MINN. L. REV. 423, 441-45 (2011); I. Glenn Cohen, Intentional Diminishment, the NonIdentity Problem, and Legal Liability, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 347, 348-49 (2008); James
Woodward, The Non-Identity Problem 96 ETHICS 804 (1986).
133. See Unif. Parentage Act § 707 (2017) (stating, “If an individual who consented
in a record to be a parent by assisted reproduction dies before placement of eggs, sperm,
or embryos, the deceased individual is not a parent of the resulting child unless the
deceased spouse consented in a record that if assisted reproduction were to occur after
death, the deceased individual would be a parent of the child.”); Amanda Horner, I
Consented to Do What?: Posthumous Children and the Consent to Parent After- Death,
33 S. ILL. U. L.J. 157 (2008); Gail A. Katz, Parpalaix c. CECOS: Protecting Intent in
Reproductive Technology, 11 HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 683, 696-98 (1998); Frozen
Embryo Dispute, supra note 4, at 376-77; Raymond C. O’Brien, The Momentum of
Posthumous Conception: A Model Act, 25 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 332, 371-75
(2009); Anne Reichman Schiff, Arising from the Dead: Challenges of Posthumous
Procreation, 75 N.C. L. REV. 901, 935-37 (1997); Ruth Zafran, Dying to be a Father:
Legal Paternity in Cases of Posthumous Conception, 8 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 47,
73-74 (2007).
134. See Shaul Israeli, 4 RESP. BEMAREH HABAZAK ch. 228-9 (2001); Shaul Israeli, 3
RESP. BEMAREH HABAZAK ch. 226 (1998); RESP. HAVUT BENJAMIN ch. 107 (1992). See
also Yossi Green, Post Modern Procreation By Means of IVF and Ibum And Haliza, 2
NETANYA ACAD. C. L.R. 207, 219-28 (2002).
135. See I Kings 21:19. This principle is embedded in article 5 of Israel’s 1965
Inheritance Law.
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the Prophet in the name of the Almighty against Ahab, King of Israel, who
wrongfully killed a man just to inherit his vineyard, which was adjacent to
Ahab’s own land. The Talmud brings a difference of opinion between the
sages on this matter: Did Ahab attempt to inherit the man based on the
general public law that if a man is killed by the king, the king inherits his
possessions? Or, as R. Yehuda claims, since Ahab was his relative, did Ahab
intend to inherit him based on private law, but was stopped by Elijah’s moral
claim, which may indicate that this Jewish ethic was well accepted in the
ancient world?136 The question of whether an heir who murders his decedent
should be disqualified from inheriting him is hotly debated in Judaism. The
vast majority of opinions contend that the biological relationship overrides
the problematic deed. Thus, Menachem Porush, one of the most well-known
ultra-orthodox members of Israel’s parliament, argued that this despicable
murderer may be punished by imprisonment, but cannot be prevented from
inheriting the deceased, as a halakhic inheritance is neither a right nor a
privilege, but an automatic process that we cannot stop.
In addition, Yitzchak Zilberstein, one of the most prominent poskim of
modern medical halakhah, stated explicitly in a responsum that a physician
who injected his wife with an overdose of medication to kill her is still
permitted to inherit her. Lastly, according to several leading professors of
Jewish and civil law, the murderer may be punished by depriving him of the
inheritance, but according to halakhah he is still fully entitled to inherit the
deceased.137 But, a more challenging and important opinion for our
discussion is a ruling by a minority of poskim that the moment the son kills
the deceased, he immediately ceases to be his biological, and therefore also
his halakhic son, which prevents him from being the beneficiary. This is a
unique and most interesting departure from genetic truth in favor of socioethical-legal considerations. These poskim are following an earlier and much
better-known exception concerning an apostate, who according to some
prominent halakhists, loses his inheritance rights upon his renunciation of
Judaism. This principle can be implemented in our context,138 not simply as
a punishment or fine, but by annulling the murderer’s status as the biological

136. See BT Sanhedrin 48b.
137. See Eliav Shochetman, Would You Murder and Also Inherit?, 302 WEEKLY

PARASHA, BERESHIT (2008), http://www.daat.ac.il/mishpat-ivri/skirot/302-2.htm.
138. See generally YOSEF ROZIN, TZAFNAT PANEACH, Matnot Aniim 108 (1979); 1
YEHOSHUA EHRENBERG, RESP. DVAR YEHOSHUA vol. 1 ch. 100 (1998); ZVI YEHUDA BEN
YAAKOV, RESP. MISHPATECHA LEYAKOV Vol. 2 ch. 23 (1997).
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son of the deceased.139
V. HALAKHIC PARENTHOOD AND INTENTIONAL PARENTHOOD – CAN
THEY BE RECONCILED?
In the previous sections I explored the application of the traditional
halakhic natural order as the basis for establishing legal parenthood, which,
prima facie, does not allow for any deviation from it to other models, such
as the social and/or psychological parenthood model, and in particular when
the alternative is intentional parenthood. In section 1, I enumerated the two
main methods for establishing halakhic parenthood in ancient times – a
coitally produced child and adoption. I discussed how, in both cases, the
natural order is sometimes completely blurred. For example, the Jewish
presumption of paternity, discussed in subsection 4.1., favors the principle
of BIC by masking the truth that the child is actually not the “legitimate”
child of his father and ignoring that, by definition, he is mamzer. In the case
of adoption, the urgent need to “fill the void” and find caring parents for the
hundreds of thousands of Jewish children orphaned in the Holocaust and in
other catastrophes and disasters that have plagued the Jewish people, has
forced Judaism to accept adoption as a legitimate option. In these two
scenarios, halakhah explicitly deviates from its principle of the basic natural
order because of other important socio-halakhic justifications, inter alia,
recognizing, even if only to varying degrees, the social and/or psychological
parenthood of the adopting parents.
As I have elaborated in several articles, I believe that both the presumption
of paternity and adoption in particular, and the social and/or psychological
parenthood model in general, are examples of implementing intentional
parenthood. The presumption of paternity is a fictional presumption that the
husband of a woman who conceives a child is the legal father of that child,
even if the father is not biologically related to the child.140 At its core, this
presumption is based on a broader societal presumption that it is the intention
of the husband of a married woman who conceives a child to serve as the
legal father of that child and to provide for the child financially.141 This
139. See Yaakov Shapira, And Again, Would You Murder and Also Inherit?, 374
WEEKLY PARASHA, Pinchas (2010), www.justice.gov.il/Units/MishpatIvri/Gilyonot/
374.rtf.
140. See Rachel L. Kovach, Sorry Daddy - Your Time Is Up: Rebutting the
Presumption of Paternity in Louisiana, 56 LOY. L. REV. 651, 655-58 (2010) (explaining
the problematic aspects of a modern adhering to this legal fiction).
141. See June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Marriage, Parentage, and Child Support, 45
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presumption demonstrates that throughout history, the natural order was
often subordinate to other considerations, including intention, in determining
legal parentage. Similarly, social and/or psychological parenthood is based
primarily on the intention and express or implied agreement of an individual
to accept legal parentage.142 One underpinning of ascribing parental status to
an individual acting as a de facto parent is the implicit understanding that,
by his or her actions, the individual has demonstrated an intent and capacity
to become a legal parent. Thus, even unintentionally, halakhah applied
intentional parenthood in the ancient era, to varying degrees.
With regard to the modern era, I discussed in subsection 2 the difficulty of
applying the natural order to current biomedical innovations, as illustrated in
the case of AID, where the identity of the genetic donor is unknown and there
is no way of compelling him to fulfill his parental obligations. Therefore,
there is no choice but to recognize the donee’s husband, wholly or partially,
as the legal parent of the conceived child. As I have explained in depth
elsewhere, the entire AID process will work effectively only if we implement
DLPBA to enhance and not damage the rights and welfare of the contracting
parties. This will allow the sperm donor to opt out of legal paternity and the
donee’s husband to opt in to this paternity solely by virtue of their reciprocal
initial intention and agreement to respectively disconnect from and connect
to the resulting child.143 But, far more problematic is the extreme blurring of
the natural order in determining legal maternity in ovum donation, IVF, and
surrogacy, where “natural” maternity is unbundled into its smaller and more
basic natural genetic and gestational components. Even if we wished to
adhere to the natural order for determining halakhic parenthood, which of
the two components is superior for establishing legal maternity? And how
exactly does surrogacy work, if not by validating the initial agreement of
DLPBA to transfer legal maternity form the surrogate mother to the
intending mother?
In the futuristic era, as I argued in section 3, the natural order will be totally
confusing, inadequate, and insufficient. Is a cloned child the child of his
progenitor? Is he the progenitor’s “long extension” of life and/or is he
FAM. L.Q. 219, 221-28 (2011); Yehezkel Margalit, Intentional Parenthood: A Solution
to the Plight of Same-Sex Partners Striving for Legal Recognition as Parents, 12
WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 39, 55-57 (2013); Bridging the Gap, supra note 6, at
12, 14.
142. See Katharine K. Baker, Bargaining or Biology? The History and Future of
Paternity Law and Parental Status, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 31-38 (2004).
143. See Status to Contract, supra note 9, at 73-74.
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actually a duplication of the progenitor? Or his (twin) brother? Or perhaps
the clone is not a human being at all and does not have any lineage?144 In
addition, the numerous exceptions to the determination of parenthood based
on the traditional natural order, mentioned earlier, clearly demonstrate
halakhah’s capacity to ignore the genetic component in favor of other
components for establishing legal parenthood, if there are important
justifications. Thus, it is imperative, and useful even in and of itself, and
especially in view of future biomedical innovations, to add intentional
parenthood to the process of establishing legal parenthood to help the
“natural order” survive all of these major changes. It is the more flexible
characteristics of DLPBA that can help us to understand correctly the initial
intentions and agreements of the individuals involved in the process of
producing a child.
In the absence of a clear halakhic consensus as to whether the genetic
mother or the gestational mother is to be recognized as the legal mother, it
may be possible, even halakhically, to differentially determine legal
maternity in the various contexts where this determination is required, based
on the initial intentions and agreement of the contracting parties.145
But, halakhah is very slow to respond, for several reasons, and its most
basic principle of the natural model for establishing legal parenthood is
unlikely to undergo a rapid change. I also do not anticipate my normative
model being accepted in its entirety in the foreseeable future. Therefore, I
will conclude this article by suggesting that we borrow some useful existing
halakhic devices that may facilitate the acceptance of my perspective and
enable my model to be applied, even if only partially. First, intended parents
can be recognized as legal parents through adoption.146 There is an animated
documented history of rabbinical courts issuing “adoption decrees” to settle
the various parental obligations which adopting parents undertake when they
adopt a child.147 Alternatively, the intended parents may be defined as the
144. See Zvi Ryzman, Is a Cloned Kohen Permitted to Recite the Kohen’s Blessing?,
http://olamot.net/sites/default/files/ratz_katzvi/pdf/-_32.pdf (in Hebrew).
145. For this challenging call, see Avishalom Westreich, Changing Motherhood
Paradigms: Jewish Law, Civil Law, and Society, 28 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.R. 97 (2017).
For a previous call to reconcile halakhah with secular Israeli law, see SHIFMAN, supra
note 98, at 25-27. For a discussion of whether it is possible to reconcile halakhah and
secular Israeli law at least in the AID case, for paying the parental obligation of
maintenance, see GREEN, supra note 116, at 124, 131.
146. See Regulating ART, supra note 1, at 450-51, 455-58; Gestation, supra note 1,
at 128.
147. See Artificial Means, supra note 29, at 326. For the importance of signing a
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conceived child’s legal guardians (apotropos), which gives them (almost) all
parental rights and obligations.
Similarly, and at least for the purpose of obligating them to carry out their
various parental obligations, particularly maintenance, it is possible to adopt
the abovementioned solution offered in 1980 by one of Israel’s rabbinical
courts. As mentioned earlier, the Haifa district rabbinical court compelled a
sperm donee’s husband to pay child support for the resulting child because,
by his explicit or implied agreement to his wife’s impregnation, he became
her guarantor (arev).148 The court explained that the husband was obligated
to pay child support based upon the principle of guarantee. In consenting to
his wife’s AID procedure, the husband implicitly guaranteed all of her
expenses in raising the child, including paying for the child’s support. This
principle can be extended to other parental obligations as well as applied to
other ART contexts.149 Lastly, even if a parent is not officially obligated by
halakhah to pay child support to his wife, he can be obligated to pay it as
charity (tzedakah).150 This is a moral obligation that throughout the ages has
become a binding legal duty. On November 30th, 2015, this binding legal
duty was expanded by the Chief Rabbinate of Israel also to women,151 and it
can be applied even if, formalistically, the intended parents are not the legal
parents.152

written adoption agreement at the outset of the adoption, see Shlomo Dichovsky, The
Parental Obligation to Support Adoptive Children, 15 TECHUMIN 278 (1995).
148. For scholarly articles discussing the suggestion of obligating the husband as a
guarantor, see Itamar Warhaftig, The Legal Validity of Reliance on Oral Promise in
Jewish Law, 2 BAR-ILAN L. STUD. 45, 77 n.212 (1982); BARUCH KAHANA, GUARANTEE
LAW 517 (1991).
149. See note 79. This interesting ruling was first mentioned by Yosi Green, Artificial
Insemination (AID) in Israeli Court Judgments and Legislation, 5 ASSIA 125, 132-34
(1986) and was discussed also by Regulating ART, supra note 1, at 444-46.
150. For a discussion of this option concerning the husband, see Menashe Shawa,
Maintenance of Minor Children in Jewish and Positive Law, 13 JEWISH L. ASS’N STUD.
289 (2002); Michael Corinaldi, Should Equality be Implemented in the Laws of Parents
and Children, 2 KIRYAT HAMISHPAT 131, 152 (2002).
151. For a secular call based on halakhic sources for a more egalitarian obligation of
child custody, see Yoav Mazeh, The Religious Law of Child Support, the Supreme
Court’s Case-Law and the Practice of Courts: Between Myth and Reality 4-18 HAIFA L.
REV. (forthcoming, 2018) (available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2556149).
152. For earlier sources in Hebrew dealing with obligating a woman to pay child
support, see Corinaldi, supra note 150.
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